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TRIBAL EXCLUSION AUTHORITY:
ITS SOVEREIGN ROOTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT
By Jeremy Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, a plane landed in Qagun Tayagungin, a
small city at the beginning of the Aleutian chain. 1 The city, known
in English as Sand Point, first emerged in the nineteenth century as
a fishing post maintained and operated in part by its Aleut residents.2
On that day in August, those residents gathered to meet the plane
and formed a semicircle around its exit ramp.3 A man, previously
identified by the community as a drug-dealer, stepped out.4 When
he did, the crowd handed him a return ticket and did not let him
leave the tarmac until he boarded a plane that would take him away
from the community.5
Such moments show the necessary role that exclusion, the
civil act of removing persons from a community space, plays in the

*

Jeremy Wood is a judicial law clerk on the Washington Court of Appeals. He
extends special thanks to Assistant United States Attorney Rebecca Cohen and
the Honorable J. Michael Diaz, former Assistant United States Attorney and
current King County Superior Court Judge. While externing for the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington, the author
drafted several memoranda for Cohen and Judge Diaz. This article grew out of
two of those memoranda. Thanks are also owed to the talented and dedicated
staff of the American Indian Law Journal who shepherded this article to
completion, sharpening and strengthening it along the way.
1
Dan Joling, In Alaska Village, Banishment Helps Keep Peace, NEWSMINER,
May 1, 2014, http://www.newsminer.com/news/alaska_news/in-alaska-villagebanishment-helps-keep-peace/article_cc940f74-df60-11e3-8d73001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/FF8W-BH63].
2
The History of Sand Point, EXPLORE NORTH,
http://www.explorenorth.com/library/communities/alaska/bl-SandPoint.htm
[https://perma.cc/X84Z-2C6W].
3
Joling, supra note 1.
4
Joling, supra note 1.
5
Joling, supra note 1.
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tribal repertoire of crime prevention tools.6 As hostile Supreme
Court precedent has restricted tribal criminal jurisdiction, the
remedy of exclusion—executed either in an informal, traditional
manner, as at Sand Point, or through formal civil procedures—
enables tribal governments to keep their communities safe.
In addition to these jurisdictional restrictions, there are
statutory limitations on the ability of tribes to issue sentences
sufficient to fully address epidemic levels of drug dealing, abuse,
and domestic violence. Sentencing maximums imposed upon tribes,
pursuant to the Tribal Law and Order Act, pale in comparison to
those available to state and federal judges.7
The first purpose of this article is to bolster exclusion’s
potential to fill those spaces where Supreme Court precedent and
statutes limit tribal jurisdiction and sentencing authority. Tribes
have created careful legal schemes to administer exclusion, to which
the federal courts should defer. The United States federal
government should also further tribal exclusion efforts by
prosecuting violations of exclusion orders and implementing policy
to require that prosecutors charge such cases.
At the same time, exclusion is a stark remedy, and its effect
on those excluded is severe. When imposed upon tribal members, it
can entail a loss of community, family, and heritage. The second
purpose of this article is to highlight the sensitive attention that tribal
legislators and courts have paid to these concerns. Rather than
second-guessing these tribal initiatives, federal actors should
support their furtherance by deferring to tribal decisions.
This article is presented in four parts. Part Two examines the
practice of exclusion in the tribal context. It considers the pressures
that led to a modern resurgence in the use of exclusion as well as the
efforts of tribal lawmakers to procedurally regulate it. Amongst
those lawmakers, tribal legislators have promulgated statutes that
delineate the offenses subject to exclusion, the rights of the
excluded, and the proper jurisdictional framework for the practice’s
exercise.

6

The relevant authorities and discussion characterize this practice as both
exclusion and banishment. Notwithstanding minor distinctions some have raised
between the terms, this article uses “exclusion” for purposes of consistency.
7
See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 202, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2016). Pursuant
to § 1302(b), tribal courts may sentence “defendant[s] to term of imprisonment
greater than 1 year but not to exceed 3 years for any 1 offense.”
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Part Three turns to United States federal law. It first
considers the common law’s traditional recognition of a sovereign’s
power of exclusion as a necessary incident of the police power.
Early on, federal courts acknowledged that same power in tribal
governments.8 This part then examines how this recognition and
other circumstances led the United States to enter into treaties with
tribal nations to protect this power of exclusion. Part Three ends by
following the decline of this recognition, when policies of allotment
devastated the tribal land base and the Supreme Court sapped the
force of the exclusion power along with it.
Part Four considers the important work the United States
executive and legislative branches have done in recent years to
support the exclusion power. Various United States Attorney’s
Offices have prosecuted individuals who enter tribal lands in
violation of a tribal exclusion order.9 By continuing to do so, they
would further the United States’ trust obligation to protect tribal
nations from hostile settler encroachment. This part also details
recent congressional efforts to reaffirm an expanded tribal power of
exclusion in the prosecution of domestic violence offenses, a power
that may eventually be applied in the prosecution of drug-related
offenses and those related to violence against children.
Part Five turns to the courts and presents, in three sections,
how current jurisprudence might develop to support tribes in
exercising the power of exclusion. The first section considers how
courts might better recognize the necessary tribal jurisdiction to
impose exclusion. They can do so by resting such jurisdiction either
on inherent tribal sovereignty or through interpreting the holding in
United States v. Montana. The second section examines the effect
of federal public accommodations statutes on tribal exclusion
power. It stresses thoughtful caution when application of such law
would impair treaty exclusion rights. And it examines how, in the
commercial context, access to tribal commercial spaces may not
implicate intramural tribal affairs, but tribal regulation of that access
certainly does. In the last section, this article considers recent

8

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 593, (1823); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S.
384, 391–92 (1904).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, No. CR 14-30038-MAM, 2014 WL
4185360, at *1 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2014); see also Press Release, United States
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of South Dakota, Man
Charged with Criminal Trespass (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usaosd/pr/man-charged-criminal-trespass [https://perma.cc/792A-BA8F].

200

decisions on habeas corpus petitions brought by excluded persons.
Based on these cases, the article suggests that federal district courts
should decline to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction in challenges
to the exclusion of nonmembers, should defer to tribal procedural
protections, and should avoid conclusions that imply that tribes
should change their law.
II. TRIBAL EXCLUSION PRACTICES
Tribes inherently enjoy the power of exclusion, and they
maintain that power unless it is abrogated by Congress. Many tribal
governments have recognized the customary roots of exclusion in
their legal heritage. The Nisqually and Tohono O’odham Tribes
have done so in appellate opinions, recognizing that the practice of
exclusion predates modern tribal organization.10 The Snoqualmie
Tribe, by constitutional provision, limits the exclusion of tribal
members “in accord with Snoqualmie tribal tradition.”11 Amongst
the Cheyenne people, traditional soldier societies continue to
implement informal extrajudicial exclusions.12
Tribal nations have employed this practice since time
immemorial. Three examples are helpful. At some point between the
twelfth and fifteenth centuries, the Iroquois Nations of the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy promulgated their constitution, the
Gayanashagowa, or Great Law of Peace, which as Congress has
acknowledged, served to inspire the framers of the United States

10

See, e.g., Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian Cmty., 2 N.I.C.S. App. 224, 234
(Nisqually Tribal Ct. App. 1993),
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/NICS/html/2NICSApp/2NICSApp224.htm
l [https://perma.cc/3HZN-9F94]; Escalante v. Sells Dist. Council, No. CTA0133 (Tohono O’odham Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2017), at 10,
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/2017-01-27-decision-of-appeal003.pdf [https://perma.cc/66TP-U52Z].
11
SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CONST. art. II, § 3,
http://www.snoqualmietribe.us/sites/default/files/linkedfiles/constitution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9FP-GV7M].
12
Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal
Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 95 (2007). These societies could banish
those found guilty of murder, disobedience of the orders of a traditional society,
theft, rape, incest, or abuse of power. Id. In 2005 the Dog Soldiers of the Crazy
Dog Society and the Kit Fox Society decided at council to banish an Indian
Health Services doctor for performing religious ceremonies on tribal land in a
manner that caused “sacrilege and desecration to [their] culture.” 12 Id. at 96
(alteration in original). The Dog Soldiers drove the doctor, a nonmember, to the
border of the reservation and ordered him to leave. Id. The Northern Cheyenne
Tribal Court, however, overturned this traditional banishment. Id.

201

Constitution.13 Section twenty of that instrument authorizes the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy leadership to banish a chief from all
Haudenosaunee territory for the crime of murder .14 Section seventyfour permits the same sanction to be imposed upon adopted
members of the confederated nations who cause a disturbance.15
Similarly, one scholar of Cherokee law has noted that the Cherokee
Nation possibly authorized exclusion as a sanction for violations of
“food and field regulations, refusal to work, [or failure to] contribute
[the proper] share of work and crops.”16
Under traditional Cheyenne law, community chiefs could
order the exclusion of a person who committed murder or drove
another person to suicide.17 Otherwise, the continued presence of the
guilty party was thought to cause continuing danger to community
welfare and emotional harm to the victim’s family.18 If the chiefs
were absent, the military societies could order an emergency
exclusion under certain circumstances.19
Exclusion was not a death sentence. Those excluded
generally found a hospitable and unquestioning reception in
neighboring tribes.20 Amongst the Cheyenne themselves, such
resident aliens were protected from harm.21 But homesickness,
understandably, still affected the excluded.22
Also, exclusion was not necessarily permanent. Although
exclusion orders were phrased for an indefinite duration, they were
regularly commuted after five to ten years.23 For example, in
deciding whether to allow readmission, the Cheyenne community
leadership considered the excluded person’s penitence and
character, the safety of the community, and the mitigating factors of
13

See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. (1988); Robert B. Porter, Building a
New Longhouse: The Case for Government Reform Within the Six Nations of the
Haudenosaunee, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 805, 814–16 (1998).
14
GREAT LAW OF PEACE § 20,
http://cscie12.dce.harvard.edu/ssi/iroquois/simple/1.shtml
[https://perma.cc/5A6P-5MKB].
15
Id. at § 74.
16
RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN
TO COURT 36 (1975).
17
KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 166–67 (1941).
18
See id. at 133.
19
Id. at 166–67.
20
Id. at 133.
21
Id. at 166.
22
Id. at 133.
23
Id. at 137.
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the underlying offense.24 Readmission also required the consent of
the military societies and the victim’s representatives.25 Even once
readmitted, the once-excluded individual was permanently barred
from certain Cheyenne rituals and sacred spaces.26
Notable Professor Karl Llewelyn praised this exclusion
scheme, characterizing it as “a technique of multiple excellence.”27
It discouraged revenge, rehabilitated the offender, and allowed for
restoration of right relations “when dangers of social disruption
were over.”28
In the nineteenth century, several tribes adopted
constitutions to codify traditional powers of exclusion, including the
Delaware, Sisseton-Wahpeton, and Pamunkey Nations.29 Many of
the relevant provisions specifically addressed the exclusion of white
nonmembers who refused to obey tribal law or who committed acts
of sexual exploitation against tribal members.
In recent years, tribes have increasingly turned to exclusion
to address crises not amenable to other measures.30 United States
law and the narrow powers it recognizes in tribes failed many of
these communities. Reliance on exclusion, one Haudenosaunee
journalist explained, comes “out of desperation.”31 The “American
route, which has proven to be a failure” requires replacement by
“ancestral discipline.”32
For example, many tribes have turned to exclusion to
confront drug-dealing epidemics. This problem exploded in recent
decades. The Lummi Tribe faces an OxyContin trade estimated at
$2 million per annum, “easily surpassing fishing industry profits.”33
Discussing the plague of drugs on his reservation, Lummi Tribal
Chairman Darrel Hillaire explained, “We need to go back to our old

24

Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 167.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 158.
28
Id.
29
DAVID E. WILKINS & SHELLY HULSE WILKINS, DISMEMBERED: NATIVE
DISENROLLMENT AND THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 50–51 (2017).
30
Id. at 68–71 (identifying twenty-six tribal communities in twenty states that
have ordered exclusions).
31
Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, Plagued by Drugs, Tribes Revive Ancient
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/18/us/plagued-by-drugs-tribes-revive-ancientpenalty.html.
32
Id.
33
Id.
25
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ways . . .We had to say enough is enough.”34 The Yupik residents of
Akiak in Southwest Alaska have struggled against the state’s footdragging in combatting their community’s drug problem. When
asked about the lack of support from local state law enforcement,
those residents explained, “If they do not enforce [tribal banishment
orders] we will enforce [them] ourselves. We will get a group of
men together and go to that person and tell him to leave and to not
come back.”35 Amongst other tribes, the Cheyenne River Sioux,
Standing Rock Sioux, and Saginaw Chippewa of Michigan have all
acted to exclude drug dealers from their reservations.36
Exclusion also allows tribes to combat ills that non-Indian
sovereigns are not forced to face. In one noted case, a tribe used
exclusion to remove a nonmember who stole and reported tribal
traditions for his own academic gain. Tito Naranjo, a professor at
the University of New Mexico, is a member of the Santa Clara
Pueblo married to a woman from the Taos Pueblo.37 He received the
opportunity to watch the Taos Deer Dance at Christmas.38 Without
asking the Taos for permission and knowing it would likely not be
granted, he wrote an essay to run in a local newspaper.39 In his
words, he would have been a “wimp” to defer to the concerns of the
Taos community.40 In response, a Taos spiritual leader filed a
complaint in tribal court calling for Naranjo’s exclusion.41 The
petition was granted.42
34

Id.
Joling, supra note 1.
36
Levi Rickert, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to Banish Meth Dealers from Tribe,
NATIVE NEWS Online (Jul. 29, 2015),
http://nativenewsonline.net/currents/standing-rock-sioux-tribe-to-banish-methdealers-from-tribe/ [https://perma.cc/8FPF-K4YH]; Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Council Votes to Banish Drug Dealers for Life from Tribe, NATIVE NEWS
ONLINE, (Jul. 9, 2015), http://nativenewsonline.net/currents/cheyenne-riversioux-tribal-council-votes-to-banish-drug-dealers-for-life-from-tribe/
[https://perma.cc/DZ2W-S5CU]; Press Release, Banishment, SAGINAW
CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE, (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://sagchip.org/news.aspx?newsid=309#.WqgYYGrwaUk
[https://perma.cc/EWK5-BNH2].
37
Marissa Stone, Dancing with Fire: Santa Clara Tribal Member Banished from
Taos Pueblo for Writing Essay About Tribe's Sacred Deer Dance, SANTA FE
NEW MEXICAN (Feb. 6, 2004),
https://web.williams.edu/AnthSoc/native/naranjo.htm [https://perma.cc/3LMRLGYF].
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
35
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Tribes have also used exclusion to combat racism exhibited
by non-Indians towards tribal members. In 2015, the Fort Peck tribal
council passed a resolution to exclude Former School
Superintendent Kim Hardin after Hardin sent an email to another
non-Native teacher in which she referred to Native teachers as
“renegades.”43 One of the councilmembers who moved for her
exclusion reported that Hardin’s actions had created a racial divide
in the community.44 By excluding such a person, the Tribe defended
the dignity of its people from the bigotry of nonmembers.
The frequency with which exclusion is applied varies across
tribes. One New Mexico attorney reported that she only dealt with a
handful of exclusion orders in her twenty-five years of practice.45
By contrast, the Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
excluded seventy-seven people from 2001 to 2014.46 In a similar
period, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians excluded sixty-two
people.47 The Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa uses
exclusion not only as a tool to remove offenders but also to shame
them as examples by posting their names online.48
Recognizing the impact of exclusion, tribal lawmakers based
exclusion statutes on a careful balancing of individual due process
and community welfare.
A. Tribal Exclusion Statutes
Many tribes have enacted statutes providing for exclusion.
The National Congress of American Indians has urged all tribes to
enact such legislation.49 A brief survey of tribal exclusion

43

Aja Goare, Montana School Superintendent Fired, Banished From
Reservation, KTVQ (May 1, 2015),
http://www.ktvq.com/story/29137083/eastern-montana-school-superintendentfired-banished-for-alleged-racism [https://perma.cc/U2XN-YL7Y] (The term
“renegade” when applied to Native individuals is widely considered a slur; it
derives from western American characterizations of Native people who refused
to relocate onto reservations.).
44
Id.
45
T.S. Last, More Tribes Bring Back Sentence of Banishment, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Jun. 24, 2016), https://www.abqjournal.com/797280/more-tribes-bring-backsentence-of-banishment.html [https://perma.cc/GSU7-TLLR].
46
Id. (Excluded tribal members were allowed to retain their membership).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
National Congress of American Indians, Res. SD-15-053, Enforcement of
Exclusion Orders, Protective Orders, and Trespass Violations in Indian
Country, at 2 (2015), http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/enforcement-of-
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ordinances shows points of similarity and difference in the ways
different tribes have chosen to codify the power to exclude. The
following examination focuses on such points as they are related to
statements of legislative intent, the class of persons subject to
exclusion, the classes of offenses that justify exclusion, tribal efforts
to overcome jurisdictional hurdles, and statutory due process
requirements.
1. Statements of Legislative Intent
Statements of legislative intent found in tribal codes shed
light on the policies underlying tribal exclusion ordinances. The
Makah Tribal Code, for example, explains that the exclusion
ordinance was passed because nonmembers “[were] increasingly
acting in utter disregard of Tribal law,” destroying and polluting
tribal resources, trespassing on tribal property, and harming “the
natural, social and psychological well-being of members and all
persons on the Reservation.”50 Similarly, the Tulalip Tribal Code
takes note of “population increases on and in the vicinity of the
Tulalip Indian Reservation” associated with its extensive
commercial developments.51 Although such developments have
brought substantial economic benefits and improved Tulalip tribal
relationships with neighboring communities, they have also allowed
for new forms of personal and property crime.52 As a result, the
Tulalip code notes a “greater number of instances in which it may
be necessary to exercise its exclusion power.”53 The Pascua Yaqui
exclusion-orders-protective-orders-and-trespass-violations-in-indian-country
[https://perma.cc/7VYF-7ZGD].
50
MAKAH TRIBAL CODE § 9.1.01,
https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/makahcode/makahlawt9.html
[https://perma.cc/QKX6-ULQF].
51
TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.010(2),
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Tulalip/?Tulalip02/Tulalip0240.html&?f
[https://perma.cc/Q4QR-89P4]. The Tulalip Tribes maintain extensive gaming
and retail businesses which employ many non-Indian workers and which draw
customers from throughout the Pacific Northwest, Canada, and further abroad.
See Richard Walker, Feds Side with Tulalip Tribes in Quil Ceda Tax Fight,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/feds-side-with-tulaliptribes-in-quil-ceda-tax-fight/ [https://perma.cc/6M4K-NS8B].
52
E.g., Tulalip Police searching for suspects in armed robbery at Seattle
Premium Outlet Mall, MARYSVILLE GLOBE (May 28, 2010),
https://blog.seattlepi.com/marysville-pi/2010/05/28/tulalip-police-searching-forsuspects-in-armed-robbery-at-seattle-premium-outlet-mall/.
53
TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.010(2).
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Tribal Code roots its exclusion authority in the “sacred duty and
obligation,” recognized in the tribal constitution, of the Tribe to
protect natural, economic, cultural, and social resources.54 The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs’ tribal code roots its
exclusion authority in treaty language providing that the tribal
reservation “shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and
marked out for [the Tribes’] exclusive use; nor shall any white
person be permitted to reside upon the same without” tribal and
federal permission.55
2. Persons Subject to Exclusion and Offenses That
Justify Exclusion
Tribal exclusion codes designate persons whom a tribe may
exclude and the offenses for which those persons may be excluded.
While some tribes only permit the exclusion of nonmembers,56 there
are others that allow exclusion to be applied broadly with few
exceptions, such as those authorized to remain on reservation by
federal law57 or those who retain real property on the reservation58.
In surveying tribal constitutions, Professor David Wilkins identified
thirty-two codes that authorized the exclusion of nonmembers who
threaten a tribe’s well-being and thirty codes that authorized the
exclusion of any person not legally entitled to remain on tribal
lands.59
Tribal codes allow for exclusion as a remedy for a broad host
of offensive conduct. Beyond general violations of tribal law, these
offenses include those affecting a tribe’s natural resources,
54

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE, tit. 5, ch. 8, § 10, http://www.pascuayaquinsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/.
55
WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.1 (quoting Treaty with the Tribes of
Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963), https://warmspringsnsn.gov/government/tribal-code/.
56
E.g., CHEHAILIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.030,
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/ChehalisTribe/; MAKAH LAW AND ORDER
CODE § 9.2.01, https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/makahcode/; PORT GAMBLE
S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 22.01.03,
https://www.pgst.nsn.us/government/law-and-order-code.
57
E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-3, https://www.cctcbc.com/current-code/; COQUILLE TRIBAL ORDINANCES § 652.375(2)(a),
http://www.coquilletribe.org/?page_id=1326; NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-2,
http://www.nezperce.org/~code/pdf%20convert%20files/14feb17%20Code%20
with%20TOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9CL-GDTF].
58
E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-3; NEZ PERCE TRIBAL
CODE § 4-4-2.
59
WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 29, at 53.
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economic welfare, and cultural integrity as well as the laws of other
jurisdictions.
The first category includes the unauthorized exploitation of
game, fish, timber, other vegetation, and mineral resources.60 It also
includes trespassing on protected lands closed to all persons or
nonmembers by a respective tribal government.61 By using
exclusion to address these offenses tribes may regain control of
resources that carry deep cultural and financial value and that have
often been prime targets for exploitation by non-Indians.
The second category aims at the sort of economic
exploitation too often attributable to nontribal members in Indian
country. Thus, the Tulalip, Chehalis, Colville, Warm Springs, and
Port Gamble S’Klallam tribes allow for the exclusion of those
committing fraud and usury as well as those who refuse to comply
with tribal business or employment regulations.62 Other tribes may
exclude those who refuse to pay tribal taxes; an issue of historic
contention in compliance.63 As discussed earlier, commerce in drugs
poses an acute threat to tribal communities. Recognizing this threat,
the Tulalip legislature enacted a mandate requiring the Tribe to
petition for the permanent exclusion for offenses related to the
production or sale of drugs.64
The third category aims at persons like Tito Naranjo who
seek to colonize, exploit, or denigrate tribal culture. Thus, the
Pascua Yaqui Tribe allows for the exclusion of those found
“conducting any sociological or anthropological studies without
60

E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-4(a)(8); COQUILLE
TRIBAL ORDINANCES §§ 652.150(1), 652.375(1)(b); MAKAH LAW AND ORDER
CODE § 9.2.02(j); PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE
§ 22.02.01(h), (i); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(12).
61
E.g., NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-3(c); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE
§ 2.40.030(2).
62
E.g., CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(N), (O), (R),
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/ChehalisTribe/; COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW
AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-4(6); COQUILLE TRIBAL ORDINANCES § 652.375(1)(c);
NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, ch. 5, § 1901(C)(2)(d), (e),
http://www.navajonationcouncil.org/Code%20Page.html; NEZ PERCE TRIBAL
CODE § 4-4-3(f), (g); PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER
CODE § 22.02.01(k), (n), (o), (p); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(18), (20);
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v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144–45 (1982).
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prior tribal council permission.”65 The Chehalis and Port Gamble
S’Klallam tribal codes similarly allow for the exclusion of those
found “[c]onducting missionary activities without permission of the
Business Committee.”66 Such an enactment mirrors those of foreign
jurisdictions historically plagued by violent proselytism.67 Because
these harms are acutely tied to histories of colonial exploitation, it
is proper that tribes should have the power to resist them and to do
so through the mechanism of exclusion.
The fourth category of offenses warranting exclusion—
violations of other jurisdictions’ laws—allows tribes to better
cooperate with neighboring jurisdictions in creating a consistent
criminal overlay. Many tribes regularly order exclusions for
violations of state and federal laws, as well as the laws of other
tribes, even if they are not prosecuted in another jurisdiction.68 Many
tribes similarly allow for the exclusion of individuals found evading
the authorities of other jurisdictions.69 The Tulalip code also allows
for the exclusion of registered sex offenders, regardless of where the
underlying sex offense or registration requirement arose.70
Similarly, Chehalis and Port Gamble S’Klallam tribal codes allow
for the exclusion of juvenile nonmembers hiding in tribal lands in
order to avoid school attendance elsewhere.71 The constitutions of
the Shoalwater and Skokomish tribes permit the exclusion and
extradition of individuals accused of crimes in other jurisdictions.72
The jurisdictional pitfalls of federal Indian law can make it
difficult for tribes to address these harms, even through exclusion.
Through smart drafting, tribal legislatures seek to overcome these
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pitfalls and to enlist the support of other sovereigns in furthering
tribal welfare.
3. Statutory Efforts to Overcome Jurisdictional
Limitations
Tribal codes address the complex jurisdictional doctrines
tribes navigate to protect their communities. Many of these codes
reflect the perspective that exclusion as a civil remedy allows a
broad exercise of jurisdiction. The Chehalis exclusion ordinance
makes this utility explicit in permitting the exclusion of those who
violate the tribal code “whether or not the Tribe has jurisdiction to
prosecute the person for the act.”73 This allows the Confederated
Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation to exclude, for example, nonIndians over whom it may not have criminal jurisdiction.74
As discussed below, other tribes have incorporated the
United States Supreme Court’s test for tribal civil jurisdiction, as
pronounced in United States v. Montana. Pursuant to that test, tribes
may exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on nonmember fee
land that is located within the bounds of a reservation in two
instances.75 The first arises when the nonmember has entered a
consensual relationship with a tribe or its members.76 The second
arises when the nonmember’s conduct threatens “the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”77 The Nez Perce Tribal Code paraphrases this same language
to allow exclusion of anyone “doing or attempting to do any act
upon the reservation which unlawfully threatens the peace, health,
safety, morals or general welfare of the tribe, its members, or other
persons.”78 Similarly, the Colville code deems exclusion a proper
remedy for an offense that “substantially threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, institutional process,
economic security or health or welfare of the Colville Confederated
Tribes, its members or reservation residents.”79 This language
warrants the respect of nonmember judiciaries, for it serves as a
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legislative determination of what conduct meets the Montana
exceptions.
Tribal exclusion codes also allow for intergovernmental
collaboration when limitations on tribal jurisdiction bar the
prosecution of certain offenders. For example, the Pascua Yaqui
Tribal Code authorizes the tribal prosecutor to refer cases to the
office of the United States Attorney.80 The Confederated Tribes of
the Warm Springs permits the referral of cases to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the United States Attorney, and state prosecutors.81
And the Coquille Tribal Code authorizes the council to enter
“cooperative intergovernmental law enforcement agreements” to
enforce both its exclusion and trespass ordinances.82
Notwithstanding this demonstrated commitment to ensuring
that tribal law is enforced, those tribes that have enacted exclusion
ordinances have incorporated extensive due process protections.
4. Statutory Due Process
Notwithstanding the keen concern tribal lawmakers have for
public safety, they have shown similar vigilance in ensuring due
process. Outside certain narrow circumstances, many tribal codes
place the burden of proving the propriety of exclusion on the tribe.83
Tribal codes also generally affirm rights to notice and hearing,
counsel, and appeal.84 These rights may be curtailed for certain
classes of offenders, such as those offenders found guilty of
domestic violence.85 Yet tribes do not ignore the continuing social
bond the excluded person may hold with the tribal community. For
example, the Tulalip code recognizes that excluded persons may
80

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE tit. 5, ch. 8, § 110(A).
WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.800.
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nonetheless enter the reservation to attend the funeral of a family
member, absent a substantial threat of harm to the community.86
The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs has crafted
separate procedural schemes for the exclusion of resident versus
nonresident nonmembers. It has done so in recognition of the fact
that an increasing number of nonresidents have entered the
reservation to traffic illegal drugs, whereas nonmember residents
typically work for the Confederated Tribes or the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and have strong social ties with the tribal community.87
Nonresidents “are not legally entitled to reside on the
Reservation.”88 In addition to enumerated reasons similar to those
discussed above,89 nonresidents may be excluded for “[failing] to
establish a legitimate purpose for [their] presence on the territory of
The Confederated Tribes.”90 The Confederated Tribes’ burden to
justify exclusion is low, and a nonresident may not appeal his or her
exclusion.91 By contrast, a resident may only be excluded for the
reasons discussed above in section II.A.2, the burden is higher, and
he or she may appeal his or her exclusion.92 These procedural
protections demonstrate the respect these tribes have shown for the
rights of residents facing exclusion. These procedural protections
should encourage non-tribal governments to respect tribes in
exercising their exclusion authority.
Tribal courts tasked with the interpretation and application
of these procedural requirements are developing a rich body of case
law on due process in the exclusion context.
B. Exclusion in Tribal Court
Tribal courts of appeals have developed rich case law
concerning exclusion.93 The tension between two broad themes, the
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88
§ 300.300.
89
See supra Section II.A.2.
90
WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.310(17).
91
§§ 300.315, 300.345.
92
§§ 300.415, 300.445.
93
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respect for the due process rights of the excluded and the necessity
to protect tribal communities, rives this case law.
1. Due Process Rights
Recognizing the “significant impact on the excluded
individual [and their] spouse and children,” tribal appellate courts
have insisted upon the protection of the due process rights of the
excluded.94 In doing so, they have taken to task tribal trial courts,
executives, and legislatures.
Due process requires allowing the excluded to challenge
their exclusion. A recent case from the Tohono O’odham Court of
Appeals shows the seriousness with which tribal judiciaries take this
right.95 Stephanie Escalante and Nolan Lopez, both tribal members,
lived on the Tohono O’odham reservation.96 Police received reports
of illegal activity at Escalante’s property.97 In response, the local
district council voted to banish Escalante and Lopez permanently.98
When Escalante tried to reenter the reservation to retrieve her
grandchildren’s medical records, she was arrested and incarcerated
for sixty days.99
Escalante and Lopez sued in tribal court to contest the
validity of their exclusions, but the trial court dismissed the action,
holding that the Tribe’s sovereign immunity deprived the courts of
subject matter jurisdiction.100 On review, the court of appeals
explained that this ruling diverged from tribal law.101 The Tohono
passed a resolution banishing nine tribal members, including a former chairman,
for treason. Sweet v. Hinzman, No. C08-844JLR, 2009 WL 1175647, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009) (The banishees could not challenge such action
within the tribe because they lacked a court and the constitution rendered their
banishment a nonjusticiable political question; they therefore filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington).
94
Lopez v. Chehalis Tribe, 4 N.I.C.S. App. 8, 15 (Chehalis Tribal Ct. App.
1995),
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/NICS/html/4NICSApp/4NICSApp008.htm
l [https://perma.cc/52NY-78FT].
95
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O’odham tribal code waived sovereign immunity to injunctive and
declaratory actions entreating the court to “determine the validity of
a law, rule, or regulation.”102 Further, the tribal prosecutor followed
guidelines indicating that banishment orders were subject to judicial
review.103
The court also held that due process under the Tohono
O’odham Constitution requires judicial review of exclusion
orders.104 Escalante and Lopez alleged that they had suffered from
their “dislocation from the family home and inability to attend
ceremonial, governmental, commercial, or social events.”105
Moreover, Escalante was incarcerated.106 Under such
circumstances, the Tohono O’odham District Council had “an
obligation not only to protect its community, but also to ensure the
fairness of banishment proceedings.”107
Other tribal courts have played a vital role in balancing those
obligations. The Squaxin Island Court of Appeals held that those
facing exclusion may require counsel in a matter concerning the
exclusion of one of its own trial judges.108 The defendant had no
criminal record before being charged with delivery of a controlled
substance.109 She lived on her tribe’s reservation where she worked
as a tribal historian and a lay judge in fishing disputes.110 Without
the benefit of counsel, she pled guilty as charged.111 The trial record
was unclear as to whether she was advised of her rights or
understood that by pleading guilty she agreed to a lifetime
exclusion.112
The court of appeals held for the defendant, concluding that
she did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty.113 Even though
the defendant was a lay judge for certain other matters, she did not
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have sufficient legal training to understand the consequences of her
plea.114 She had also been denied her due process right to a separate
exclusion hearing.115 Under such facts, the court held that upholding
the exclusion would constitute injustice and, as such, allowed the
defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and remanded the matter to
the trial court with the benefit of counsel that she may have private
retained.116
The Skokomish Tribal Court of Appeals noted the political
importance of due process in Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Chaplin as
follows:
most tribes understand that exercising this
[exclusion] authority arbitrarily or in violation of
established procedures creates a climate that
discourages the investment of time, energy and
financial resources in the tribe and the reservation by
the tribe’s business partners, tribal tenants, the nonmember spouses and parents of tribal members.117
In Chaplin, the appellate court reversed an exclusion order
because the trial court had failed to comply strictly with the
governing statute.118 A tribal member had accused her nonmember
daughter-in-law of assault and theft.119 Without further
investigation, the tribal council authorized the tribal attorney to file
a complaint to exclude the nonmember.120 The tribal attorney filed
the motion.121 The nonmember’s husband appeared in court to
explain that the mother-in-law was lying and often meddled in their
marital affairs.122 A hearing on the merits revealed no evidence to
support the mother-in-law’s allegations.123 Nonetheless, the trial
court ordered exclusion for the unproven offenses.124
114
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The court of appeals reversed based on procedural and
substantive errors.125 Skokomish tribal statute required the party
seeking civil exclusion, here the mother-in-law, to file a proper
request for exclusion.126 The mother-in-law had not done so.127
Thus, the trial court “erred in failing to require strict compliance
with the procedures governing a complaint for exclusion.”128 The
court did not explain why it emphasized strict compliance, but such
a requirement is reasonable given the gravity of exclusion.129 Like
any analogously serious sentence, an exclusion order must be
executed under the highest standard of legal compliance. The court
of appeals recognized it was not a threat to be casually applied.130
The court also took issue with the fact that the Skokomish
Tribe may have replaced the original complainant, the mother-inlaw, as petitioner for the exclusion.131 While the Skokomish Tribe’s
exclusion ordinance allowed the complainant and petitioner to be
different persons, the court found this to be in conflict with the
Tribe’s rules of civil procedure.132 In doing so, it cited to the
Skokomish Tribal Code, which provides that “[j]udges and the
administrator of the Tribal Court have a duty to tell the Skokomish
Tribal Council which additional rules are needed to govern common
procedural questions faced by the court.”133 However, the court
carefully noted that the mother-in-law not only disappeared from the
face of the complaint but also had “herself excused from even
having to appear and give testimony at the court hearing.”134 In so
stating, the court seemed to emphasize the important right of
confrontation.
Other tribal courts of appeals have developed frameworks to
ensure that those facing exclusion are not haled into a court lacking
proper jurisdiction. The Chehalis Tribal Court of Appeals has,
pursuant to this consideration, required that trial courts conduct a
two-tiered analysis before ordering an exclusion.135 The trial court
125
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must conclude first that a defendant committed a charged offense
and second that exclusion on the basis of that offense is “necessary
to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the community.”136 The
Port Gamble S’Klallam code requires the tribal council make this
same two-tiered finding before ordering an exclusion.137
Just as tribal appellate courts have reversed trial courts for
failing to comply with statute, they have also chastised executive
officers when they attempt to usurp the rule of law. Separation of
powers is a notoriously controversial issue in Indian country.138 The
distinct legal heritage of each tribe does not always conform to the
tripartite model of the United States Constitution with its checks and
balances.
In Chehalis Indian Tribe v. Charles, the tribal governing
body, the business committee, had decided to exclude a nonmember
who had lived on the reservation for decades.139 While the business
committee had filed a petition with the court, as was its right, it had
provided no witnesses and instead asked the trial court to accept
“automatically” all evidence admitted at its earlier legislative
hearing.140 The court of appeals rejected this hubristic request and
concluded that simply “[b]ecause the Business Committee finds that
[the nonmember] should be excluded does not mean the court will
also reach that finding without substantial evidence.”141 Rather, the
business committee had to prove its case like any other litigant.142
In reaching such a decision, the court affirmed that the tribal
governing body was subject to due process.143
Lastly, tribal appellate courts have not hesitated to criticize
tribal legislation, either in dicta or by striking down offensive laws.
As an example of dicta, the Chehalis Court of Appeals in Lopez v.
Chehalis Tribe urged the Chehalis Tribe’s council to legislate for
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stronger defendant’s rights while suggesting a statute of limitations
for exclusion cases.144
In Burns Paiute Tribe v. Dick, the Burns Paiute Tribe struck
down a tribal statute as vague and overbroad.145 In that case, the
Burns Paiute Tribe had excluded several members for certain traffic
and criminal charges.146 The trial judge had allotted each appellant
fifteen minutes to gather his things before going, under escort, to
leave the reservation.147 He did so in accordance with a tribal statute
providing for the exclusion of those who violate any tribal, federal,
or state law, or else harm the health, welfare, culture, or spirit of the
Tribe.148 On appeal, the excluded members argued the exclusion
ordinance was too vague to “inform those who are subject to it what
conduct will render them liable to its penalties.”149
The court agreed, also concluding that the statute was too
broad; it allowed for the exclusion of a nonmember who committed
“a parking violation on the reservation or [who] committed an
infraction in Florida.”150 The Burns Paiute Tribe argued it would
never enforce it in such a broad fashion.151 The court rejected this
contention and focused upon the statute rather than its executive
enforcement.152 As such, the court reversed the order of
exclusion.153
The reasoning in Dick, however, came under critical scrutiny
in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Jones.154 The Hoopa Court of Appeals, in
a learned opinion by Judge Matthew Fletcher, explained that the
court in Dick had identified no actual vagueness in the statute at
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issue in that case.155 Rather, it had drawn concern to the overbreadth
of the statute, which could allow for exclusion of those who
committed traffic violations.156 But “the breadth of the Exclusion
Ordinance [was] a policy question left to the policymaking branch
of government” not to the courts.157 The statute at issue in Jones,
which is identical to that in Dick, might reach minor offenses, but “a
person of common intelligence could easily discern that
possibility.”158
This sampling of tribal appellate opinions demonstrates the
serious commitment tribal courts have made to protecting due
process for those facing exclusion. This commitment has served to
guarantee a defendant’s rights to counsel, confrontation, judicial
review, and other procedural safeguards, while simultaneously
requiring that tribal governments make their case in strict
compliance with tribal law. They have not hesitated to chastise the
political branches of tribal governments or to strike down
impermissible legislation. The examples illustrated demonstrate that
due process is well protected within tribal governments. Other
examples show an equally important concern for tribal welfare.
2. Protection of Tribal Welfare
Tribes have shown an equal unwillingness to allow
nonmembers to exploit the complexities in tribal jurisdiction to
escape sanction. The checkerboard of nonmember fee land on
reservations can often obstruct tribal efforts to exclude the owners
of property lying within the bounds of a reservation. Thus, the
Chehalis court in Lopez, cited above,159 also recognized the
“necessity of preserving the Tribe’s sovereign powers, not the least
important of which is the Tribe’s power to exclude.”160 Because
tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,161
exclusion is a necessary tool to allow for the removal of those who
155
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harm the community’s members. Tribes have used it for this
purpose. Thus, in Schoening v. Chehalis Tribe, the court held that
the Chehalis Tribe’s jurisdiction over non-Indians extended to the
exterior borders of the reservation.162 All those residing within the
reservation were subject to the Chehalis Tribe’s personal and
territorial jurisdiction.
The Hoopa Court of Appeals refused to recognize a
limitation on its jurisdiction over persons on private fee land that
would endanger public safety in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Jones.163 In
that case, an excluded tribal member had appealed his exclusion as
an unconstitutional taking of his real property within the
reservation.164 The trial court found that he had conveyed the
property at issue to his daughter who reconveyed it to him after
proceedings were already underway.165 On that basis, the court
concluded that the after-acquired nature of the property precluded a
takings claim.166 In dicta, however, the court explained that it would
not have concluded the property unconstitutionally taken even if the
appellant had held it at the time of trial.167 Exclusion did not cause
a person to lose his property, it “merely” effected an easement
precluding the person from occupancy.168 The excluded party
retained the rights to “develop the property, rent it, sell it, alienate it
in any other manner, exclude others, etc.”169 A taking, by contrast,
required the destruction of a parcel’s economic value, which was
absent in this case.170 To hold otherwise, the court noted, would
allow any person who has ever been incarcerated to claim their
sentence effected a taking.171
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This article now turns to discuss the longstanding
recognition in United States federal law of the exclusion power held
generally by all sovereigns and specifically by tribes.
III.

THE TRIBAL EXCLUSION POWER IN
AMERICAN LAW

The federal courts have long recognized a tribal power to
exclude both as an incident of inherent sovereignty and as a
recognized treaty right. This section traces the history of that dual
recognition from ancient principles of common law and
international law to Indian law precedent in American
jurisprudence. Although Western legal systems have recognized the
sovereign power to exclude since ancient times, United States courts
have deliberately and gradually divested that power from tribes to
facilitate non-Indian settlement in tribal territories.
A. The Sovereign’s Inherent Exclusion Power
Western sovereigns have used exclusion as a punishment for
crimes and political hubris since ancient times.172 During certain
historical periods, it was the primary form of punishment utilized by
societies unable or unwilling to employ widespread incarceration.
For example, between 1650 and 1750, Amsterdam banished 97
percent of noncapital criminal defendants.173 This practice did not
cease in the United States. The Constitution of Maryland explicitly
contemplates the exercise of the exclusion power,174 and courts in at
least twelve states have either upheld intrastate exclusions or
recognized that they may be permissible under proper conditions.175
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Between 1998 and 2001, Houston County, Georgia, banished 142
individuals.176 Outside such explicit affirmances, scholars have
identified subtler exclusion practices—for example, sentencing
courts ordering defendants excluded as a condition of probation, or
governors making exclusion a condition of pardon.177
The right to exclude originates in the inherent authority of
the sovereign to police for the general welfare.178 The Supreme
Court, drawing upon international law authority Ermin de Vattel,
explained that the “sovereign may forbid the entrance of his
territory, either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases, and
under particular circumstances, or as to particular individuals, and
for particular purposes.”179 That power carried the right to exclude
as well as the corollary power to condition admittance.180 As
Supreme Court Justice William Patterson explained, “it is a power,
that grows out of the very nature of the social compact” and must
belong to every government.181
The sovereign’s recognized right of exclusion features
prominently in the Marshall trilogy, the foundation of federal Indian
Law. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justice Marshall cited Vattel
in explaining that tribes retained their status as nations with all the
sovereignty inherent to that status, until qualified by Congressional
fiat or ruled inconsistent with domestication.182 Thus, American law
understood tribal sovereignty to carry the inherent authority to
exclude.183 Similarly, in the earlier case of Johnson v. M’Intosh,

(Wash. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 132 (Colo.
1997); Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1991).
176
WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 29, at 17.
177
Matthew D. Borrelli, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy
Arguments Against This Revived Ancient Punishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
469, 478 (2003); e.g., In re Cammarata, 67 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. 1954).
178
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 67 (1824)
179
Id.; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY, bk. II, § 94, at 169–70 (J. Chitty ed., 1839).
180
Id.
181
Cooper v. Telfair, 4. U.S. 14, 19 (1800) (Paterson, J., concurring).
182
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 53, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831).
183
For example, in Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897), the Supreme Court
recognized that because tribes controlled admission into their territory, they
could order expulsion. Id. The banished person in that case was not a tribal
citizen by blood but had received that status by tribal edict upon marrying a
tribal member. Id. The tribe later disenrolled and expelled him. Id. The Court
upheld the tribe’s control of its citizenship and held that “all personal rights

222

Justice Marshall pronounced that “no tribunal [could] revise and set
aside” a tribe’s decision to abolish one’s property rights and exclude
him from its territory.184
The Eighth Circuit elaborated upon this power in Buster v.
Wright as follows:
to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may
transact business within its borders did not have its
origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the
United States. It was one of the inherent and essential
attributes of its original sovereignty. It was a natural
right of that people, indispensable to its autonomy as
a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an
attribute of its government until by the agreement of
the nation itself or by the superior power of the
republic it is taken from it.185
Late into the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed these holdings in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache.186 There,
the Court held a tribe could tax the business activities of nonmember
lessees on their land. In doing so, the Court stated the following:
Nonmenbers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain
subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them. This
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place
conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on
reservation conduct…When a tribe grants a nonIndian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees
not to exercise its ultimate power to oust the nonIndian as long as the non-Indian complies with the
initial conditions of entry. However, it does not
follow that the lawful property right to be on Indian
land also immunizes the non-Indian from the tribe’s
exercise of its lesser-included power to…place other
conditions on the non-Indian’s conduct or continued
presence on the reservation. A nonmember who
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enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to
the risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign
power.187
The Court explicitly grounded this right in tribal sovereignty
rather than any humbler right incidental to landownership. It
explained that the sovereign power to exclude was not “merely the
power possessed by any individual landowner or any social group
to attach conditions…to the entry by a stranger onto private land or
into the social group.”188 It recognized that a contrary position
would “denigrate[] Indian sovereignty.”189 Such a holding derives
in a clear line from the position espoused by Vattel, grounding the
power of exclusion in the sovereign’s general power to police for
the general welfare.
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has retreated from
that line. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court instead
characterized the right of exclusion as a mere component of
landownership, such as might be enjoyed by any private party.190 In
that specific case, the Associated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation had entered into an agreement with the State under
which the tribe retained no gatekeeping authority over a certain right
of way.191 On this basis, the Court held it had lost the “landowner’s
right to occupy and exclude.”192
But the police power of exclusion is greater than that of a
landowner. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State of Illinois, the
Supreme Court held that the state of Illinois could not convey
tidelands within the public trust to a railway in a manner that would
place it outside state jurisdiction.193 It held that a sovereign could
not “abdicate its police powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace.”194 While the purposes of
governance may at times require the sovereign to delegate such
powers to other bodies, like the state in Strate or private parties,
“there always remains with the [sovereign] the right to revoke those
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powers and exercise them in a more direct manner, and one more
conformable to its wishes.”195
Viewed in light of such a rule, the consequences of Strate
become apparent. With Strate, the Court departed from Illinois
Central Railroad Co. and severed the exclusion power from its roots
in sovereignty, replanting that stick amongst the frail bundle of the
landowner’s rights. As discussed below, continued judicial
endorsement of outdated allotment policies has already plucked
several of those sticks from the bundle.
Such a change in the law departs from the executive’s
longstanding recognition that the tribal exclusion power has been
affirmed in countless treaties.
B. The Treaty Right
This section examines the process by which the United
States and various Indian nations signed treaties that recognized the
right to exclude. It focuses on nine treaties that Washington
Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens signed with tribal nations
throughout the Pacific Northwest in the mid- to late-1850s.196 These
treaties share the same Article Two (hereafter Common Article
Two), by which reservations were established for a tribe’s
“exclusive use” where no “white man [would] be permitted to reside
upon [reservation land] without permission of the tribe and the
superintendent or agent.”197 The Indian canons of construction
require this language to be analyzed in light of the “history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by
the parties.”198 The history underlying Common Article Two
provides for this consideration.
In the early 1850s, United States settlement policy in the
Pacific Northwest had grown increasingly schizophrenic. While
assuring tribal nations that it would protect them against
encroachment absent transfer of land by treaty, it had also passed
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the Donation Land Act, unleashing eager homesteaders into the
region.199 Conflict became inevitable. In 1854, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs described the circumstances behind this eventuality
as follows:
Indian tribes still claim title to the lands on which the
whites have located, and which they are now
cultivating. The jealousy which has resulted from
this state of things has naturally led to repeated
hostilities, resulting in severe suffering, and in some
instances the murder of white settlers, and hindering
the general growth and prosperity of the civil
communities of those Territories.200
Governor Isaac Stevens of the Washington Territory was
tasked with negotiating treaties to resolve this conflict and free up
land for white settlement.201 Tribal leaders agreed to negotiate so
they might protect their resource rights and avoid violence. 202 The
first of the Stevens Treaties failed to achieve this result.203 Within a
year of signing the Treaty of Medicine Creek, the Nisqually led their
tribal allies to war against the settlers of Puget Sound in order to
preserve their most valuable farmlands that were not included within
the treaty reservation.204 This conflict, known as the Puget Sound
War, remained in the minds of later treaty negotiators and informed
the Snoqualmie negotiators of the treaty of Point Elliot to remark,
“[i]f you whites pay the Indians that fight you, it must be good to
fight.”205
Other negotiators simply wanted the settlers to leave so that
they might regain some peaceful prosperity. Thus, tribal parties to
199
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the Treaty of Point No Point asked Stevens to “order[ the settlers] to
go away.”206 A Skokomish member explained that his fellow
Skokomish wanted to plant potatoes in their territory but feared that
settlers would steal them unless Congress ratified their tribal
boundaries and recognized their power to exclude settlers.207 The
tribal negotiators wanted those settlers gone regardless of their
status as residents, transients, or exploiters of tribal territories.208
They negotiated a multi-faceted treaty framework that echoed the
understanding embedded in the common law that sovereigns
enjoyed the police power to exclude persons from their territory.209
In light of this history and the understandings of the Indian
signatories, the Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the treaty with the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs, has correctly explained
that Common Article Two was “designed to provide [the Tribe] land
where they would be able to separate themselves from non-Native
Americans” and must be construed to effectuate this purpose.210 The
author will return below to the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of Common
Article Two in considering whether federal courts should allow the
exclusion of federal officers enforcing generally applicable federal
law.
Regardless of this historical backdrop, the strong right of
exclusion affirmed in common law and treaty was soon eroded by
the greed of the allotment era Congress.
C. Allotment and the Judicial Impairment
of the Exclusion Power
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, as the fires of
the Indian Wars cooled, a boundless hunger for tribal lands
rekindled in the East. In quenching that hunger, the United States
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would break its recent promises to protect the right of tribes to
exclude settlers. Two examples are instructive.
The appropriation of the Black Hills in the territory of the
Sioux Nation is emblematic of these pressures and their result. The
United States had earlier agreed to protect the rights of the Lakota
to the Black Hills from settler depredations.211 This changed when
gold was discovered in the Black Hills in 1875 and settler
immigration intensified.212 Rather than meet this settler violence
with force of arms, the United States concluded, in the words of the
Secretary of the Interior, that it had become “impossible to keep the
white people out.” 213 Instead of protecting tribal interests, the guns
were turned against the Lakota in the Black Hills War, and their
exclusive monopoly upon their sacred sites was shattered.214
In another example, the United States reneged on earlier
treaty promises to the Nez Perce by shrinking their reservation. The
Nez Perce Tribe signed a treaty with the United States in 1855
guaranteeing its exclusive use and occupancy of an extensive
reservation.215 In 1861 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs informed
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs that an “invasion” of gold
mining settlers had begun to increasingly threaten these treaty
rights.216 Senator James Nesmith of Oregon observed that while the
Nez Perce had “faithfully observed the obligations of the treaty,” the
United States had violated it by “permitting [American] citizens to
invade their reservation in search of gold.”217 The next year, the
Indian agent on the Nez Perce reservation issued an injunction
against the entry and residence of settlers.218 The Commissioner
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reported to the Secretary of the Interior that the Nez Perce Indian
Reservation would “in a short time be so overrun and occupied by
whites, as to render it practically useless for Indian purposes.”219
The United States ultimately responded to settler violence by
negotiating a subsequent treaty that reduced the Nez Perce
reservation by ninety percent.220 It determined that this was the “best
way to preserve peace.”221 Again, the United States broke its
promise to maintain the rights of tribes in the exclusive use and
possession of their reservations.
The pressure of settlement, fanned by executive
acquiescence, soon translated into congressional policy. “Driven by
a greed for the land holdings of the tribes,” Congress passed the
General Allotment Act also known as the Dawes Act after its
sponsor, Massachusetts Senator Henry Dawes.222 The Dawes Act
authorized the President to survey those reservations he deemed
suitable for agriculture and to divide them into allotments for
individual Indians.223 Accordingly, President Theodore Roosevelt
characterized the Act as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up
the tribal mass [in that [i]t acts directly upon the family and the
individual.”224 Once persons on the selected reservations had
received the allotments, the surplus was opened to settlement.225
Additionally, the allotments were not safe from further
alienation. By the original Act’s terms, the United States would hold
the allotments in trust for twenty-five years, after which the persons
would take them in freely alienable fee.226 But Congress quickly
bowed to the entreatments of settlers and amended the original Act
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to allow the Secretary of the Interior to cut short this trust period and
confer fee title on any Indian deemed “competent and capable of
managing her affairs.”227
Without these restrictions on alienation, the land quickly
transferred from Indian hands to those of settlers and federal
institutions like the military and National Park Service. Many tribal
allottees struggled to succeed agriculturally, for their efforts were
often hampered by the general economic downturn of the time.228
Because the allotments had become subject to state taxation, many
were ultimately seized for nonpayment of those taxes.229
Speculators purchased up these lands in “voluntary or fraudulent
sales…[or] at sheriffs’ sales for nonpayment of taxes or other
liens.”230 The climate of allotment encouraged other settlers to
simply squat on reservation land without attempting to buy it,
confident that their crimes would face little repercussion.231
Between the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887 and its repeal
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, tribes lost an
estimated two-thirds of their land base.232
With the loss of their land, tribes lost the power guaranteed
by treaty to control settler violence on their reservations. In this
period, tribes continued to exercise jurisdiction over land remaining
in Indian hands, regardless of the changed character of the
surrounding area.233 Thus, in 1908, the Rosebud Sioux Police,
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enforcing federal regulations, arrested a tribal member on his
allotment in the otherwise open area of the reservation for hosting
an illegal dance.234 After the Tribe released the arrested member, the
member notified the state police of his detention; the police then
arrested the tribal officers.235 With their authority so compromised,
tribes and their members struggled to maintain the safety of their
communities.236 As Indian Superintendent Thomas King reported in
regards non-Indian exploitation of tribal members on the Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation, “[T]he feeling [among settlers] is that the
Indian is fair game for anyone who can hit the mark.”237
Around the same time, both the Supreme Court and Eighth
Circuit recognized that allotment did not prevent tribes from
imposing certain business regulations on those doing business
within their territories. In Morris v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court
powerfully declared that allotment and the consequent opening of
many reservations did not:
deprive these Indians of the power to enact laws with
regard to licenses or taxes, nor exempt purchasers of
town or city lots from the operation of such
legislation. Purchasers of lots do so with notice of
existing Indian treaties…Such lands are sold under
the assumption that the purchasers will comply with
the local laws.238
Similarly, in Buster, discussed above,239 the Eighth Circuit
concluded that:
[the Creek Nation’s] jurisdiction to govern the
inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited
by the title to the land which they occupy in it…The
theory that the…conveyance of the title to lots or
lands within it to private individuals exempts
the…owners or occupants of such lots from the
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exercise of all its governmental powers…is too
unique and anomalous to invoke assent.240
The Solicitor of the Interior agreed, recognizing in 1934 that tribes
retained the power to exclude as a landowner, as well as a local
government, for this power derives from “dominion as well as
sovereignty.”241
However, Superintendent King’s words concerning the
increasing vulnerability of tribes and their members would prove
prescient. Since allotment, tribes have struggled to exercise their
power to exclude nonmembers from checkerboarded reservations.
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the
allotment period to have deprived tribes not only of land but of their
sovereign jurisdiction.242 The relevant treaty in that case, the 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty, provided in its second article that a reservation
would be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation” of the Indians therein named.243 The Court recognized
that this right arguably preserved the Crow Tribe’s jurisdiction over
hunting and fishing in areas of the tribe’s exclusive use and
occupation.244
In concluding that the Crow Tribe lacked jurisdiction to
regulate non-Indian fishing on nonmember fee land within the
bounds of its reservation, the Court explained that the Allotment Era
Congress did not intend “that the non-Indians who would settle upon
alienated allotted lands would be subject to tribal regulatory
authority. Indeed, throughout the congressional debates, allotment
of Indian land was consistently equated with the dissolution of tribal
affairs.”245
The Supreme Court has explained that treaty language
recognizing the right to exclude “with respect to reservation lands
must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands.”246
It has questioned whether “Congress would intend that non-Indians
240
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purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction
when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate
destruction of tribal government.”247 Most poignantly, the Court has
held that Congress’s purpose of so-called “peaceful assimilation”
could not “be advanced if feeholders could be excluded from fishing
or hunting on their acquired property.”248 By making these
statements, the Court argued that the alienation of tribal lands had
shattered the exclusivity of their use and occupation by tribes. In
doing so, the Court prioritized the intent of the Allotment Congress
and the expectations of that era’s rapacious settlers over the treaty
rights of tribes and the intent of today’s Congress.249
To reach this result, the Court had to narrow Morris and
Buster to their facts, holding them to stand for the proposition that
tribes may regulate the conduct of those who enter consensual
relationships with those tribes or their members.250 But the Buster
court had pronounced broadly that “[t]he theory that the consent of
a government…to the conveyance of the title to lots or lands within
it to private individuals exempts the…owners or occupants of such
lots from the exercise of all its governmental powers…is too unique
and anomalous to invoke assent.”251 Such an understanding had
prevailed when the United States negotiated provisions like
Common Article Two with tribes. Unless Montana is read to
impliedly give assent to such an anomalous theory, then Montana
must stand, in this respect, for the proposition that residence within
the boundaries of a tribal reservation exhibits a sufficient consensual
relationship to support tribal civil jurisdiction.
While Congress has since disavowed the policy of allotment,
the Supreme Court has refused to abandon it and continues to
perpetuate the allotment agenda. While the Indian Reorganization
Act repudiated the allotment policies of previous legislation, it “did
not restore to the Indians the exclusive use of those lands that had
already passed to non-Indians.”252 Inasmuch as tribes no longer
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possess exclusive use over much of their reservations, they lack the
power to exclude absent the two exceptions announced in Montana.
The power to exclude has been used to affirm tribal zoning
authority in reservation areas of predominately tribal ownership. In
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, the Yakima Nation argued that it maintained the right to
regulate the use of nonmember fee land within its reservation as an
incident of its treaty power of exclusion.253 The relevant treaty with
the Yakimas indicated that the land reserved by the Yakima Nation
“shall be set apart…for the [Yakimas’] exclusive use and
benefit…[and no] white man, excepting those in the employment of
the Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said
reservation without permission of the tribe.”254 However, the Court
held that the power to exclude only extended as far as the Yakima
Nation’s “exclusive use and benefit” of the land.255 As such, a
majority of the Court recognized only the power to zone where it
was necessary to protect the welfare of the tribe, in accordance with
the relevant Montana exception.256
However, a minority, announcing the judgment as to a
consolidated case and concurring in the overall judgment, explained
why the introduction of non-Indian landownership should not limit
exclusionary jurisdiction. The appellants in Brendale were
landowners on the Yakima reservation.257 One lived in an open area,
defined by non-Indian ownership over the majority of land.258 The
other lived in a closed area defined by majority tribal ownership.259
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O’Connor, concluded that the
Yakima Nation could exercise zoning authority over the closed
area.260 The Supreme Court reasoned that non-Indian ownership
over a “very small proportion” of the area, did not “deprive the tribe
of the right to ensure that this area maintains its unadulterated
character.”261 The Supreme Court recognized the impact a contrary
holding would have on that character in the following passage:
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The incremental shifts in the texture and quality of
the surrounding environment occasioned by discrete
land-use decisions within an expansive territory are
not readily monitored or regulated by considering
whether the uses that were actually authorized on
[the relevant] property imperiled the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the Tribe.262
Stevens’ opinion provides a powerful reflection on the
impact of recent directions in relevant law. Tribal sovereignty and
self-government depend on the right to control entry to the
sovereign’s territory. By reducing the tribal exclusion power to an
incident of landownership, courts have ensured that allotment can
continue to wreck its terrible magic, carving away at tribal wellbeing.
In summary, the courts have retreated from the bold
recognition of early precedent and the terms of treaties. Earlier
courts, including the Supreme Court, recognized that the right to
exclude was an incident of sovereign police authority. As such, the
sovereign could exercise it within the borders of its domain,
regardless of who owned the land on which a to-be-regulated
activity occurred. But conceding to the policies of allotment, the
Supreme Court has retreated and allowed a policy directed at
divesting tribes of their landholdings to inappropriately divest them
of their police power. Brendale, a split opinion recognizing the tribal
power to zone and exclude when a tribe controls the majority and
the character of a relevant area, presents a narrow exception to this
rule, but by and large, courts guided by opinions like Montana and
Strate have reduced tribes to landowners.
As discussed below, the judiciary has departed from the
trajectory of the other political branches as the latter become more
willing to reaffirm the relationship of the exclusion power to
sovereignty.
IV. SUPPORT FROM THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
In signing treaties with Indian nations, the United States
assumed an obligation to protect tribes in the exclusive use of their
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reservations.263 As discussed above,264 this protection was a guiding
motivation for the relevant tribal signatories. This section discusses
how the political branches of the federal government, the executive
and the legislative, can each assist in upholding that trust.
Pursuant to its treaty promises, the United States should
assist in the enforcement of exclusion orders. The same
administration that enacted the Indian Reorganization Act
recognized an inherent tribal authority to exclude nonmembers since
at least 1934, when Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold and his
assistant Felix Cohen published an opinion entitled “Powers of
Indian Tribes.”265 According to Solicitor Margold, those powers
included the power
[t]o remove or to exclude from the limits of the
reservation nonmembers of the tribe, excepting
authorized Government officials and persons now
occupying reservation lands under lawful authority,
and to prescribe appropriate rules and regulations
governing such removal and exclusion, and
governing the conditions under which nonmembers
of the tribe may come upon tribal land.266
The Department of Justice has put the Interior’s recognition
of a tribal power to exclude into practice by enforcing federal
trespass laws.267 The United States Attorneys for the Districts of
New Mexico and South Dakota have provided powerful and recent
examples of this action.268 In New Mexico, the Nambe Pueblo
263
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passed a resolution in February 2014 excluding a non-Indian named
Steve Romero from its boundaries indefinitely.269 Romero was a
repeat drug and domestic violence offender.270 The Pueblo therefore
deemed him a threat to the community and the maintenance of peace
therein.271 As such, they excluded him.272 But Romero violated that
order and returned to the reservation to harass tribal members.273
The U.S. Marshal’s Service removed him.274
The United States Attorney then entered and charged
Romero with criminal trespass for violating the Nambe Pueblo’s
exclusion order under the Indian Country Crimes Act and New
Mexico law.275 He may face up to a year in prison.276
The United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota
brought similar charges in United States v. Nichols.277 Steve
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Nichols, a non-Indian resident of Chicago, had been convicted
several times in federal court for violent assaults committed within
the Rosebud reservation.278 The tribal court and council ordered his
exclusion, which he subsequently violated several times.279 On
March 14, 2014, he was arrested by the tribal police for driving on
a public Bureau of Indian Affairs road within the boundaries of the
reservation.280 Because he was not Indian, the tribal police contacted
the FBI.281 The United States Attorney charged him with violating
South Dakota’s Criminal Trespass statute as incorporated by the
Assimilative Crimes Act and the Indian Country Crimes Act.282 The
court’s disposition of the matter is discussed more fully below.
The National Congress of American Indians supports these
federal prosecutions. In 2015, it passed a resolution urging federal
law enforcement and United States Attorney’s Offices to “fully
enforce tribal exclusion orders, protection orders and trespass laws
against those who cause serious threats to persons and damage to
property in Indian [c]ountry.”283 It also called upon Congress to
“consult with Indian tribes and develop legislation to increase
federal penalties and deterrence for Native and Non-Natives who
violate tribal exclusion orders…and repeat offenders of Indian
country hunting, fishing, and trespass laws.”284
In order to recognize tribal sovereignty, foster a spirit of
collaboration, and earn the trust of tribes, the United States federal
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government should develop an official policy deferring to tribes
regarding their exclusion practices. For example, the Department of
Justice or local United States Attorney’s Offices should issue
regulations requiring line prosecutors to either charge exclusion
violations referred by tribes under state trespass statutes or provide
tribes with justification for their declining to do so. Doing so will
further what one scholar has recently characterized as the “duty of
protection” the federal government has assumed to protect the safety
of tribal communities that have been partially divested of sovereign
power.285
Congress may also further tribal efforts by affirming broader
tribal jurisdiction to better facilitate the exclusion of offenders. It
took a substantial step by reauthorizing the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) in 2013. Amongst its provisions, that Act
amended 18 U.S.C. § 2265 to recognize full tribal jurisdiction “to
issue and enforce protection orders involving any person, including
the authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt
proceedings [and] to exclude violators from Indian land.”286 While
this power has allowed tribal governments to make substantial
progress in confronting non-Indian domestic abusers, critics have
pointed to a range of offenses it does not cover. These offenses
include crimes committed by offenders without sufficient tribal ties,
crimes between strangers, and crimes against children.287
Congress recently considered expanding the jurisdiction
reaffirmed under VAWA. Senate Bill 2785, introduced without
passage in the 114th Congress, would have expand VAWA’s grant
of special criminal jurisdiction to cover drug-related crimes, crimes
against children, and crimes against tribal law enforcement.288
Federal prosecutors and Congress should continue to
maintain this support in bolstering the tribal power of exclusion. As
one scholar notes, support from the political branches for the
expansion of tribal self-government in law and order should
encourage federal courts to exercise great caution when considering
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challenges to the tribal exclusion power.289 Those courts, on their
own, can take immediate steps to broadly interpret tribal jurisdiction
in the exercise of the exclusion power.
V. A NEW FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF EXCLUSION
For better or worse, challenges to tribal exclusion orders will
often reach the federal courts. Challenges to these orders raise many
unresolved issues. This article highlights three areas of concern.
First, it addresses the jurisdictional question by explaining that tribes
retain sufficient jurisdiction to order exclusions on either an
independent and inherent sovereign basis or on the proper
application of the Montana exceptions. Second, it looks to
circumstances where federal public accommodations laws may
seem to impair tribal exclusionary power. Third, it responds to
recent litigation on the use of habeas corpus as a remedy to
exclusion.
A. Tribal Exclusion Jurisdiction
There is little question that the Montana presumption placed
severe limitations on tribal jurisdiction over civil matters, including
those concerning exclusion.290 But this article considers two bases
on which courts may rely in their efforts to support the right to
exclude. First, courts can recognize that the tribal power of
exclusion rests on a separate and independent basis of sovereignty,
which is distinguished from the general civil jurisdiction covered
under Montana. Second, courts can support the tribal exclusion
power under the two-prong Montana test itself.
1. The Independent Basis Theory
The independent basis theory to support the right of
exclusion draws on longstanding Supreme Court precedent and
289
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traces back to the work of the jurist Vattel.291 As the Court in the
Merrion opinion recognized, tribes maintain a power of exclusion
that is independent of their status as landowner.292 Rather, it
proceeds from the sovereign’s power to control entry onto its
territory.293
The District Court for the District of South Dakota rested on
similar grounds in upholding charges against Nichols.294 After
Nichols was charged, he moved to dismiss the trespass charges,
collaterally attacking the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s original exclusion
as ordered without personal jurisdiction.295
In considering the extent of a tribe’s civil regulatory
jurisdiction, the court recognized that “as a general matter,” under
Montana, “tribes do not possess authority over non-Indians who
come within their borders.”296 Thus, outside the Montana
exceptions, they cannot “regulate the use of [nonmember fee]
land.”297 But “[a]s part of their residual sovereignty, tribes retain the
inherent power to exclude outsiders from tribal territory.”298 This
power “exists independently of their general jurisdictional authority.
Even when they lack civil or criminal jurisdiction over a
nonmember, their officers nonetheless may eject individuals who
have violated tribal law or stop, detain and deliver them to the proper
authorities.”299 As such, the court pointed back to the Merrion
opinion’s recognition of the exclusion power’s separate basis in
tribal sovereignty.300 By doing so, the court suggested that the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe had an independent basis for jurisdiction over
Nichols even though he was arrested for traveling on a non-tribal
road; this is the same situation found in Strate. But unlike in Strate,
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe was not trying to adjudicate conduct on
land that they did not own. Rather, it attempted to exclude Nichols
from the reservation as a step collateral to any particular conduct
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triggering the exclusion.301 Put otherwise, Strate pertained to tribal
jurisdiction over conduct; Nichols pertained to jurisdiction over the
entry of persons.
Ultimately the court decided the matter on Nichol’s failure
to exhaust his challenge to tribal jurisdiction in tribal court.302 It also
noted that the Montana exceptions might well have supported
general tribal civil jurisdiction.303 But the strongest jurisdictional
basis was the separate and independent basis for the exclusionary
power.304 As such, it provides a model to preserve Merrion’s broad
recognition of tribal authority into the future.
Still, careful application of Montana holds its own promise.
2. Preserving the Exclusionary Power
Under Montana
As discussed above, Montana introduced a presumption
against general tribal civil jurisdiction over the conduct of
nonmembers on fee land. Thus, in considering how courts can
broadly recognize tribal exclusionary authority, it must be noted that
the Montana exceptions do not limit tribal control over exclusion
from tribal lands. The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Norton v. Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation supports this
conclusion.305
In that case, Utah state police had pursued Todd Murray, a
Ute tribal member, onto his reservation and shot him to death.306
Murray’s family and tribe sued the involved officers in tribal court
for wrongful death, trespass, and other torts.307 The officers sued in
federal court seeking an injunction.308 The federal court granted this
relief, holding that the Supreme Court had foreclosed tribal civil
jurisdiction over state police officers, thus making tribal exhaustion
unnecessary.309
The Tenth Circuit reversed that order. It concluded that the
officers had failed to exhaust their tribal remedies, a necessary
301
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prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction because the trespass claim
“at least arguably implicate[d] the tribe’s core sovereign rights to
exclude and to self-govern.”310 It characterized the power to exercise
these rights as “traditional and undisputed.”311 Further, it held that
adjudication of a trespass claim concerned not the tribal court’s
adjudicatory authority but its regulatory power to control entry.312
Although the Tenth Circuit held Montana to govern, it did so to
“‘readily agree[]’ that the tribe had jurisdiction to bar nonmembers
from tribal land and recognized that the tribe may place conditions
on nonmembers’ entry onto tribal land over and above the authority
that tribes have to regulate nonmember conduct on reservation land
in general.”313
Returning to Montana’s effect on fee land, the Supreme
Court recognized two exceptions to the presumption against tribal
jurisdiction. The first arises when the offender has entered into a
consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, and the second
arises when the relevant conduct threatens “the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of [a] tribe.”314 As
discussed above, many tribes have incorporated these exceptions
into their exclusion codes.315 Further, most circumstances of
exclusion will fit within one or both of these exceptions.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Hardin v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe is illustrative of this fact.316 In Hardin, the tribal
defendant had excluded Hardin for concealing stolen federal
property.317 In upholding the exclusion, the court recognized the
diminution of tribal criminal jurisdiction affected by Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,318 a case in which the Supreme Court had
concluded that tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.319 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Oliphant had
not limited a tribe’s civil power to exclude those it could not
prosecute.320 The court also recognized that Montana does not limit
310
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this authority when a tribe exercises it to “keep reservation peace
and protect the health and safety of tribal members.”321
Thus, the court held that the “intent of the tribal [exclusion]
ordinance is merely to remove a person who ‘threatens or has some
direct effect on the…health or welfare of the tribe,’ a permissible
civil regulation of the Tribe’s internal order.”322 Similarly, by
choosing to enter and reside on the reservation, Hardin had entered
a sufficient consensual relationship to justify subjecting him to
exclusion.323 Although Hardin is distinguishable from Strate,
because Hardin lived pursuant to a lease with the tribe that expressly
reserved the tribe’s power to exclude, the exclusion at issue
extended beyond the leased trust land under his home, for it
encompassed the entire reservation.324
Hardin provides important lessons to courts upholding the
tribal exclusionary power. First, in applying the first Montana
exception, the Ninth Circuit accorded comity and deferred to the
tribe’s assertion that it was acting to protect tribal welfare. As
discussed earlier, tribes must confront many social ills in their
communities, including drug commerce, violence, and colonial
exploitation, which were all introduced by non-Indians.325 Tribal
governments are in the best positions to assess these ills and craft
appropriate solutions. Courts should not second-guess the intent
behind these solutions.
The expertise that tribal courts and legislatures utilize in
interpreting and applying the first Montana exception highlights the
importance of the tribal exhaustion requirement. The Supreme Court
has held that parties challenging tribal regulatory or adjudicative
jurisdiction generally must do so first in tribal court.326 Moreover,
they must maintain that challenge through the entire process
afforded by tribal law, including administrative, trial, and appellate
review.327 This provides federal courts reviewing tribal actions “the
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benefit of [tribal] expertise in such matters” “by allowing a full
record to be developed in the Tribal Court.”328 That expertise may
pertain to both the “factual and legal bases for the challenge to
[tribal] jurisdiction.”329 To excuse exhaustion and thus provide
“unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct
competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter’s
authority over reservation affairs.”330 The factual concerns
underlying exclusionary jurisdiction are complex and are often
unique to the tribal context. Strict adherence to the exhaustion
doctrine and comity between federal and tribal courts are therefore
necessary.
Regarding the second Montana exception, courts should
follow Hardin and recognize that nonmembers enter a consensual
relationship with a tribe by virtue of their entry onto reservation
land.331 This follows Vattel’s longstanding principle that the
exclusion power is a corollary of the right to control entry. Montana
limits tribal regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction over conduct by
nonmembers on their own fee land. Once on that land, nonmembers
can act without otherwise entering a consensual relationship with
the tribe whose reservation surrounds it. But they enter such a
relationship at the time they come on to the reservation.
Even this broad interpretation of the first Montana exception
does not apply, most offensive conduct will imply or involve a
sufficient consensual relationship. The transactions involved in the
drug trade provide an obvious commercial example, but the same
can be said for instances of violence perpetrated by non-Indians.
The recent case of Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians provides a helpful example.332 Here, Dollar
General contracted with a youth job training program operated by
the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.333 A Dollar General
manager allegedly molested a tribally enrolled youth participating
in the youth training program, who had been assigned to work at
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Dollar General.334 The case concerned the jurisdiction of the
Mississippi Choctaw Tribal Court over tort claims based upon the
alleged molestation.335 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
company had entered a sufficient consensual relationship with the
tribe and its members by contracting with a tribal job training
program and taking on the victimized youth in an internship
capacity.336 If the posture of the case were transformed into an action
for exclusion against the manager, a sufficient consensual
relationship would also be found. The abusive manager consents to
enter a relationship with his victim by commission of his offense.337
Montana does not require the consensual relationship to preexist the
offensive conduct.
Similarly, there is no just reason to say that the person who
abuses his spouse has entered a sufficient relationship but the person
who chooses to abuse a stranger has not. Both offending persons can
foresee the territorial sovereign exercising its jurisdiction over such
conduct or over such persons to conclude that they are not wanted
on the reservation.
Thus, courts can support tribal exclusion power under the
Montana exceptions by exercising a spirit of comity and deferring
to tribal interpretations of the tribal welfare exception, as well as by
interpreting the consensual relationship exception broadly. Even so,
special issues arise when tribes seek to exclude those persons
protected by federal law.
B. Exclusion and Generally Applicable Federal Law
Tribal exclusion actions may, at times, conflict with federal
statutes guaranteeing access to certain persons. As an example, the
Makah Tribal Code allows for the exclusion of persons with
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contagious diseases.338 This provision may allow exclusions that
would seem to violate Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), which guarantees disabled persons equal access to
places of public accommodation.339 When the exercise of tribal
rights interferes with public accommodation protections, the results
are “difficult case[s], in which significant values are in conflict that
cannot be fully reconciled. Both the Indian tribes and people with
disabilities share strong interests in maintaining independence and
self-sufficiency, and both groups face substantial obstacles in
protecting those interests, historically and currently.”340
This article considers the possibility that an exclusion action
may conflict with a federal statute to provide some thought on when
the tribal exclusion power might trump generally applicable federal
accommodations law. It concludes that such instances might arise
when tribes retain a treaty-protected right of exclusion or when the
tribe has taken steps to regulate and protect against discriminatory
barriers to access.
The Eleventh Circuit considered whether Title III provided
a private right of action against Indian tribes in Florida Paraplegic,
Ass’n.. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.341 Here, two associations for
the advancement of disabled people’s rights sued for injunctive
relief against the defendant tribe (d/b/a its casino) to remedy failures
to meet ADA requirements for the accessibility of public
accommodations.342 The court considered, first, whether ADA Title
III applies to Indian tribes, and, second, whether the Act abrogates
tribal sovereign immunity.343
The Eleventh Circuit applied a Ninth Circuit test to
determine whether Title III provided a right to plaintiffs. Pursuant
to Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, a general federal statute
presumptively applies to Indian tribes unless its application would
(1) abrogate treaty rights, (2) interfere with purely intramural
matters touching exclusive rights of self-government, or (3)
contradict Congress’s intent.344 Because the third exception focuses
338
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on the specific text and intent of the relevant federal statute,
consideration of whether application of ADA Title III contradicts
congressional intent would not bear upon application of other
statutes. Thus, this article focuses on the first two exceptions.
1. Impairment of the Treaty Right to Exclude
A court will not presume a general federal statute to apply to
Indian tribes if that application would impair a treaty right. Under
this rule, analysis of a relevant federal statute consists of two parts.
First, the court must identify and interpret the relevant right in the
treaty.345 Second, it must consider whether the right is sufficiently
specific to bar application of the statute.346 The scope of the right
will depend on how the statute will be applied; in some
circumstances, the right will be too general to bar application, but in
others it will be sufficiently specific.
The first step looks to the treaty history of the specific tribe
involved in a given case. Once the appropriate treaty is identified, it
is interpreted in accordance with the Indian canon of statutory
construction. The canon requires that “[a]mbiguities in tribal treaties
[be] construed liberally to favor Native Americans and to respect
traditional notions of Native American sovereignty.”347 Further,
“treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have
understood them.”348 Intent may be evidenced by “the history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by
the parties.”349
As discussed above,350 Common Article Two of the Stevens
Treaties provided reservations to be established for the tribes’
“exclusive use” where no “white man [would] be permitted to reside
upon [reservation land] without permission of the tribe and the
superintendent or agent.”351 The tribal negotiators wanted those
settlers gone regardless of their status as residents, transients, or
usufructory exploiters of tribal territories.352 Interpretation in the
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light of such facts suggests that the right reserved under Common
Article Two not only covered the exclusion of non-Indians from
residence on the reservation but “set[] forth a general right of
exclusion.”353
Once the tribe and court identify the relevant treaty right, the
tribe must show that the general right, as applied to the proposed
statutory application, would present what the Sixth Circuit in
Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB called a specific and
“direct conflict [with] the entry necessary for effectuating the
statutory scheme.”354 In United States Department of Labor v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US DOL), the
Ninth Circuit considered whether treaty language similar to
Common Article Two presented such a conflict. In US DOL, the
tribe sought to exclude federal inspectors acting pursuant the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).355 Recognizing that
the treaty provided for a general right of exclusion, the Court
analyzed whether that right was broad enough to allow the tribe to
exclude the OSHA inspectors.356 In doing so, it looked to an earlier
Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Farris, which analyzed Article
Two of the Treaty of Medicine Creek.357
The Farris court had considered whether the treaty protected
certain Puyallup Indians from federal prosecution for running an
illegal gambling operation. While the court in Farris only
considered the “exclusive use” component of Common Article
Two,358 US DOL also described that court as having interpreted the
bar on non-Indian residence.359 US DOL interpreted Farris to have
“restricted the treaty rights exception to only subjects specifically
covered in treaties, such as hunting rights.”360 Applying the Coeur
d’Alene standard to its evaluation of the applicability of OSHA, US
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DOL held that a “generalized right of exclusion may not be
sufficient to bar application of [OSHA].”361 If the court held
otherwise, “the enforcement of nearly all generally applicable
federal laws would be nullified, thereby effectively rendering
the…rule inapplicable to any tribe which has signed a Treaty
containing a general exclusion provision.”362
The cases interpreting the conflict between exclusion rights
vary depending on whether they rely on Common Article Two or
not. Many of those that do not have involved the entry of federal
officers acting on the basis of their limited statutory authority.363 In
order to bar the entry of federal officers, treaty language must
specifically speak to their exclusion.364 The Tenth Circuit found
such language in the 1868 treaty with the Navajo Nation (the
Nation).365 The Nation had signed that treaty with the United States
after wars, numerous forced marches (remembered today as the
Long Walk), and internment in the concentration camps of Bosque
Redondo.366 The Nation had a specific interest in limiting the entry
of settlers and federal officers “in order to achieve an end to conflict
and ensure peace.”367 They, therefore, negotiated a treaty that
permitted entry to only those “federal personnel…specifically so
authorized to deal with Indian affairs.”368 This language “provid[ed]
for specific exclusion rights over all persons” and, therefore, barred
the applicability of a general statute such as OSHA.369
Common Article Two was drafted with reference to a history
and set of concerns distinct from those underlying the Navajo
Treaty. As discussed above, the principle contention expressed by
many Northwest tribes was with private settlers, not the federal
government. By agreeing to move onto a reservation, where federal
officers would help them, treaty negotiators intended, albeit under
duress, to consent to the ultimate authority of the United States.
Thus, Common Article Two laid out a cooperative scheme for the
361
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right to exclude non-Indians that could be exercised by both the tribe
and federal superintendent. Such language, as interpreted in US
DOL, Farris, and Soaring Eagle, would be insufficient to allow for
the exclusion of federal officers. Yet the right must stand for
something, or it will present “an impotent outcome to negotiations
and a convention which seemed to promise more, and give the word
of the [United States] for more.”370 Common Article Two
recognizes the right the Indian negotiators sought, the power to
exclude private settlers who act without federal mandate from their
reservations. To interpret the treaty so narrowly as to incapacitate
the ability of tribes to exclude those private non-Indian individuals,
even in the context of a statute protecting access to public
accommodations, would render it a nullity.371
2. Intrusion on Tribal Self-Governance
in Intramural Affairs
The second Coeur d’Alene exception bars a statute’s
application if it would concern “exclusive rights of self-governance
in purely intramural matters.”372 Intramural matters are those “such
as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic
relations.”373 Notably, the operation of tribal commercial enterprises
falls within such intramural matters.374 The Ninth Circuit, however,
has suggested that tribal efforts to regulate non-intramural conduct
may be sufficient to bar statutory application.375 If the tribe has
regulated the conduct and the plaintiff has not exhausted his tribal
370
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remedies pursuant to that regulation, application of the statute would
intrude on tribal self-governance.
Coeur d’Alene itself held that this exception was
inapplicable to “[t]he operation of a farm that sells produce on the
open market and in interstate commerce” because it was “not an
aspect of tribal self-government.”376 Similarly, in Florida
Paraplegic, the Eleventh Circuit found the tribal casino to be a
normal “commercial enterprise.”377
But the second Coeur d’Alene exception may be satisfied not
only when statutory application would touch intramural conduct but
also when it would intrude on tribal regulation of non-intramural
conduct.378 In Solis v. Matheson, an Indian-owned retail store
appealed the United States Department of Labor’s efforts to apply
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), arguing its operation was an
intramural, tribal matter.379 The court easily dismissed this
argument, for the store was a commercial enterprise not owned by
the tribe and engaged in extensive employment of and commerce
with both nonmembers and non-Indians.380 The court did, however,
recognize that the tribe had a “strong interest as a sovereign in
regulating economic activity involving its own members within its
own territory.”381 The court suggested that application of federal
law, therefore, could interfere with self-government not only by
directly regulating governmental conduct but also by preempting
tribal efforts to regulate non-governmental conduct.382 In the case
under its review, the FLSA did not threaten such interference as the
tribe “ha[d] not enacted wage and hour laws.”383 That result might
have differed if the tribe had enacted such laws.
Tribal regulation of casinos is illustrative of how exclusion
from a commercial facility is used to regulate intramural activity.
For example, chapter 17.05 of the Nisqually Tribal Code concerns
procedures for barring a patron from the tribal casino. Pursuant to
that chapter, the “Tribal Gaming Agency may bar a patron from the
376
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casino if the Agency determines that the patron poses a threat to the
safety or security of the gaming operation” based on its observation
of the patron’s “behavior, recent criminal history or association with
gangs or other criminal organizations.”384 The Agency cannot bar a
patron based on criminal history alone without “other evidence to
suggest that the person poses a threat to safety and security at the
Casino.”385 The code provides aggrieved patrons an administrative
remedy, allowing them to “appeal the barring or request a removal
of the bar to the Tribal Gaming Commission.”386 The Tribal Gaming
Commission is required to “restore the patron’s access to the Casino
if it is determined that the patron is no longer a threat to the safety
and security of the Casino.”387 While the preceding protections
apply broadly to all patrons, only tribal members are entitled to
restored access at the “earliest possible date” and cannot be
permanently barred.388
This hypothetical consideration of the ADA Title III’s
relation to tribal exclusion actions teaches two important lessons
regarding generally applicable federal laws and exclusion. First,
courts must look carefully to treaty provisions pertaining to
exclusive tribal use of the reservation. Interpretation of such
provisions may differ depending on whether the excluded person is
a private actor or a federal officer acting according to an official
mandate. Second, courts must remember that concerns of tribal selfgovernment do not only arise when the site of exclusion is a
governmental institution like public housing. Tribes have important
and intramural governing concerns in regulating the adjudication of
exclusion actions concerning nongovernmental spaces. Thus, the
Coeur d’Alene test will preclude the application of federal
accommodations law until the complainant has exhausted his tribal
remedies to exclusion, unless a federal agency brings enforcement
litigation.
This article turns last to an issue gaining recent traction in
the federal courts, the use of habeas corpus as a device to allow
federal judicial intervention in exclusion decisions.
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C. Habeas Corpus
Increasingly, excluded persons have petitioned the federal
courts to grant them writs of habeas corpus to challenge their
exclusion. They ask for such relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA). ICRA provides that the “privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall be available to any person in a court of the United
States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe.389 Congress guaranteed a broad panoply of rights under Title
I of ICRA, including due process and equal protection in tribal court,
but it provided a narrow opportunity for relief through habeas corpus
alone.390 How it reached this result is detailed at length in the most
important ICRA case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.391
In Martinez, Martinez famously challenged the Santa Clara
Pueblo’s ordinance granting membership status to the children of
mixed marriages when the father was a tribal member.392 She argued
that the ordinance violated her children’s rights to equal protection
under ICRA.393
The United States Supreme Court considered whether ICRA
provided such a cause of action. The Supreme Court explained that
Congress had passed the ICRA with “[t]wo distinct and competing
purposes,” the protection of individual civil liberties in the tribal
context and the furtherance of tribal sovereignty.394 In doing so, it
distinguished the “interference with tribal autonomy and selfgovernment” that would result by recognizing such a cause of action
from the substantive changes ICRA mandated in tribal
proceedings.395
Congress had not intended to provide a federal forum to
resolve disputes properly adjudicated within the tribe’s own
bounds.396 The Supreme Court cited Congress’s rejection of an
earlier bill that would have allowed de novo review of all tribal
convictions, paying them less respect than federal agencies
receive.397 The Court concluded that such a provision would
389
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“deprive the tribal court[s] of all jurisdiction in the event of an
appeal, thus having a harmful effect on law enforcement within the
reservation,” because instead, Congress passed a law allowing only
habeas corpus relief.398 Such a limitation indicated recognition by
Congress “that resolution of statutory issues under [ICRA], and
particularly those issues likely to arise in a civil context, will
frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which
tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal
courts.”399
By including the above limitation, ICRA preserves an
important space in American jurisprudence for tribes to consider and
adjudicate such compelling arguments on their own terms. As the
Court explained, “Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians
and non-Indians.”400
In the decades following Martinez, a split has emerged
between the Second and Ninth Circuits over whether the narrow
window so carefully constrained by the higher court may be
widened to embrace habeas corpus challenges to exclusion orders
under ICRA. This section will discuss and critique the Second
Circuit’s seminal decision in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians,401 which allowed for the issuance of habeas corpus relief in
the exclusion context. The critique stems from numerous subsequent
decisions by the Ninth Circuit and its subsidiary district courts.
The Second Circuit decided Poodry in 1996.402 The
Tonawanda Band had permanently excluded certain members of the
Band’s Council of Chiefs after those members broke away and
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formed their own competing government.403 Having characterized
the petitioners’ formation of a competing council as an act of
treason, the Tonawanda Band had sent groups of fifteen to twentyfive people to demand the members’ immediate removal.404 Those
excluded sued in federal court, arguing that their exclusion
constituted a detention triggering ICRA’s habeas corpus
provision.405 The Second Circuit concluded that it did. In reaching
this conclusion, the court explained that petitioners had met the three
requirements for habeas relief: there was (1) a criminal sanction, (2)
sufficient detention, and (3) an exhaustion of all other available
remedies.
Analysis of these three elements in Poodry and the Ninth
Circuit’s responses are instructive.
1. A Criminal Sanction
Regarding the first requirement for habeas relief, the Second
Circuit held habeas relief directed against a separate sovereign was
likely available only in the criminal context.406 However, the Second
Circuit explained that whether a relevant sentence was criminal or
civil depended on the Anglo-American heritage of the habeas writ
rather than tribal tradition.407 It noted that exclusion had “clearly and
historically been punitive in nature.”408 Faced with conflicting
testimony on whether exclusion was viewed as civil or criminal in
tribal custom, the court relied on Anglo-American common law to
conclude it was criminal for the purposes of habeas corpus relief.409
Exclusion is a fundamentally civil proceeding as recognized under
most tribal laws and under Supreme Court precedent. Yet the writ
of habeas corpus is designed to provide relief from criminal
detention.
Drawing on Poodry, the District Court for the District of
Oregon reconciled this contradiction in Alire v. Jackson.410 The
Second Circuit had confronted an exclusion ordered in direct
403
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response to alleged acts of treason. While allowing that habeas
review might extend beyond cases involving a criminal conviction,
it had to “ar[i]se in a criminal context.”411 In the Oregon case, the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation had excluded
a nonmember caregiver previously convicted in tribal court of
children under her care.412 It was not until several months later,
however, that many tribal members petitioned successfully for the
tribal council to exclude her.413 The district court reasoned that her
exclusion lacked the close temporal nexus to a criminal proceeding
described in Poodry.414 As such, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain her petition for habeas corpus.
The District Court for the Eastern District of California,
however, disagreed. In Quair v. Sisco, it considered an exclusion
ordered absent an underlying criminal prosecution.415 Although the
court considered the relevant facts at extraordinary length, it
concluded that “the imposition of [exclusion] renders…proceedings
criminal [per se] for purposes of habeas corpus relief.”416
This conclusion departs from Poodry and Martinez and
disables tribes in exercising perhaps their only tool to combat
lawlessness within their reservations without federal interference.
The Alire rule requiring a close temporal nexus between a criminal
proceeding and the exclusion order furthers the purposes of ICRA
to provide federal relief in the most extreme cases while protecting
the Act’s goal of aggrandizing tribal sovereignty. Other districts
should adopt the Alire rule so as to provide a forum to persons
improperly detained in criminal contexts without further carving
away at the fragile civil jurisdiction of tribes.
2. Sufficiency of Detention
Returning to Poodry, the Second Circuit considered whether
permanent exclusion effected a detention within the meaning of
ICRA. Detention, the Supreme Court had held, did not require actual
physical custody.417 Rather, it required “severe restraints on
411
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individual liberty.”418 A “short-lived suspension of privileges” was
not severe enough to suffice.419 The exclusion of the petitioners,
however, was sufficient. The Second Circuit cited the forceful
groups sent to demand removal, accompanying assaults, the denial
of electrical service to the petitioners, and their disenrollment to
justify exclusion.420 Though the petitioners had not yet been
removed, they lived under the uncertainty of not knowing “if, when,
or how their sentences [would] be executed.”421 The court
analogized this state of uncertainty to that of American citizens
ordered denaturalized though not yet deported, whose rights to
petition for habeas corpus had long been recognized.422 Like the
denaturalized, the excluded faced the loss of cultural, economic, and
social ties with their nation.423
The Ninth Circuit distinguished and rejected Poodry’s
understanding of detention in Tavares v. Whitehouse.424 Disagreeing
with internal governance decisions, certain members of the United
Auburn Indian Community submitted their grievances to the mass
media to accuse the tribal council of fraud in tribal financial
matters.425 They alleged to the media that the tribe and its enterprises
were not “stable partner[s] for business.”426
In response, the United Auburn Indian Community tribal
council banned these members temporarily from tribal lands and
facilities for slandering the tribal government in non-tribal fora.427
The exclusion orders were issued for between two and ten years.428
Yet the petitioners maintained the right to vote by absentee ballot in
tribal elections.429 They kept their medical benefits.430 None of the

418

Id. at 894 (quoting Hensley v. Mun. Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist.,
Santa Clara Cty., California, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)).
419
Id.
420
Id. at 895.
421
Id.
422
Id. at 895–96.
423
The dissent, by contrast, argued that ICRA’s habeas corpus remedy was
designed to protect those liberties shared by the American public generally,
rather than those enjoyed especially by tribal members. Id. at 902 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
424
Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17429, 2018 WL 1460776 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2018).
425
Id. at 867.
426
Id. at 868.
427
Id.
428
Id.
429
Id.
430
Id.

258

petitioners were disenrolled.431 They could still access private lands
within the reservation.432
The members had received no right to hearing or appeal,433
so the tribal members took their claim to federal court and filed for
habeas corpus relief under ICRA. The district court dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the exclusions
did not rise to the level of a “detention” sufficient to warrant relief
under ICRA.434
Affirming that order, the Ninth Circuit distinguished ICRA’s
limited relief to petitioners in “detention” with the federal courts’
broader jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus writs to petitioners “in
[the] custody” of federal and state authorities.435 The Ninth Circuit
explained that when Congress passed ICRA, detention was
understood to constitute a narrow subset of custody.436 Custody
referred to “physical control of the person” with or without physical
confinement,437 but detention specifically required physical
confinement.438 The Ninth Circuit then held that three reasons
precluded the exercise of habeas jurisdiction under ICRA.
First, unlike those presented in Poodry, these exclusions
were temporary.439 Even the Second Circuit itself had limited
Poodry in this matter. In Shenandoah v. United States Department
of the Interior, it held that temporary exclusion orders presented an
insufficient limitation on the petitioner’s liberty to support habeas
corpus jurisdiction.440
Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]n many cases, a
tribe’s decision to temporarily exclude a member will be another
expression of its sovereign authority to determine the makeup of the
community.”441 The federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review
such determinations, and thus it was not proper to include exclusion
within the definition of “detention.”442
431
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Third, habeas corpus relief was improper because it would
interfere with the authority to exclude nonmembers, as recognized
in Merrion.443 But the court also clarified that inherent sovereignty
supported the exclusion of members and nonmembers alike.444
Considering these reasons and the interpretive canon
requiring that ambiguous statutes be construed to favor tribal
sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit concluded that when Congress used
the word “detention,” it had not meant to include exclusion orders,
at least when temporary in duration.445 To the extent that the
petitioners brought meritorious claims, the proper remedy must be
sought in tribal court, not in recourse to the federal courts.446
Tavares provides a persuasive outer limit for federal court
intervention. The writ of habeas corpus is justly extraordinary.
While the availability of such relief is integral to maintaining the
rule of law, the interference it represents becomes problematic when
applied by the colonizer against the governments of the colonized.
Therefore, courts should be extremely reluctant to grant such writs
and should not do so where exclusion is only temporary. To act
otherwise would be a retreat from the Court in Martinez’s stand
against federal intrusion into tribal affairs. As the Ninth Circuit
noted, the canons of construction, properly established to protect
tribal sovereignty, urge that ICRA’s ambiguities be interpreted
against this intrusion. The Second Circuit, by contrast, relied on
general habeas corpus law, not habeas corpus principles particular
to the Indian law context.
Further, Tavares explained why federal courts should
hesitate to review even the exclusion of members, stating that such
review might lead to interference with the decision to exclude
nonmembers.447 Courts should carefully guard against such
interference. The Poodry court, based on its facts and its citation to
denaturalization cases, construed exclusion as a loss of national and
political identity.448 While exclusion may force nonmembers to
forsake certain social or employment ties, it does not entail the
corresponding loss of homeland. Thus, Alire distinguished Poodry
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from the nonmember in its own case who had “not been stripped of
her Indian name, her lands, her tribal citizenship, or her tribal
membership, nor has she been [excluded] from her own tribe’s
reservation or territory.”449 Similarly Quair held that the excluded
petitioners were detained because their exclusion was coupled with
disenrollment; the court contrasted the petitioners with excluded
nonmembers who would not face such a double harm.450 Such a
holding conforms to the purpose of exclusion as a recognized treaty
right: controlling the entry of nonmembers in order to ensure the
peace and welfare of a tribe.
To conclude otherwise would turn ICRA into a hammer,
battering away at the sovereign boundaries of Indian country.
Further, courts considering petitions for habeas corpus filed by
excluded nonmembers should distinguish Poodry. The Second
Circuit in that case held that exclusion was a sufficiently severe
restraint on liberty to trigger habeas corpus because it worked a
“destruction of [the petitioners’] social, cultural, and political
existence.”451 It reached this conclusion in explicit rejection of the
dissent’s argument that ICRA served to provide relief from
restraints on liberties shared by the American public and not those
enjoyed specifically by tribal members.452
Additionally, its analogy to the denaturalization of American
citizens loses all sense if applied to persons deprived of a
membership they never had. The American public has, pursuant to
Merrion, Cherokee Nation, and associated cases, no right to settle
or trespass on Indian lands.
In contrast, the consequences of exclusion for members are
grave. The excluded may lose the right to attend important family
and ceremonial functions.453 They lose the right to certain services
and political rights.454 Perhaps most importantly they may lose a
great degree of respect.455 The petitioners in Tavares complained
449
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that elders amongst their members had lost the right to access
services reserved to elders, and others alleged that they were treated
as “criminals or untouchables.”456 Similarly, a woman facing
exclusion on the Lummi reservation after her son, who was listed on
her lease, was convicted of drug-dealing, described the experience
as “[s]piritually…tak[ing] your insides and turn[ing] them inside
out.”457
In sum, Tavares sets the best example for lower courts to
follow. Lower courts should hold that exclusion does not effect a
detention necessary for the exercise of federal jurisdiction,
especially when the exclusion is temporary, directed against
nonmembers, or implicates tribal decisions regarding membership.
The harms not only of exclusion but also of impairing its use are
grave and best resolved by tribal governments. For this reason,
lower federal courts have looked to what remedies tribes may offer.
3. Availability of Tribal Remedies
Returning to Poodry, as discussed further below, the court
recognized that the tribe allowed no other remedies, explaining that
“there is no tribal review available in the circumstances of this
case.”458 Absent federal habeas review, the excluded would have
“no remedy whatsoever.”459 Thus, tribes should offer the excluded
the option of review.
Sweet v. Hintzman,460 the first exclusion case to proceed to
federal trial, illustrates this necessity. Here, the Snoqualmie council
had preliminarily excluded certain members who had established a
shadow government to replace the established government.461 After
that, the council provided improper notice to the excluded.462 It
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changed the time and date of the exclusion hearing many times.463
It notified the excluded only as to the city in which the proceeding
would take place.464 When the excluded learned more details by
word of mouth and appeared to testify, they were denied entry to the
venue by tribally contracted police officers.465 The excluded waited
several hours before they left frustrated at the denial of their right to
testify.466 The trial provided further opportunity to question whether
ICRA was properly interpreted by federal or tribal law. The
excluded members argued that federal constitutional law ought to
control while the tribe pointed to tribal statute and traditions of
exclusion from the remote and recent pasts.467
Counsel in Sweet, Rob Roy Smith, has speculated that these
courts may have dismissed legal actions for lack of jurisdiction if
they saw “due process or a functioning tribal court” permitting the
excluded to seek an internal tribal review of the exclusions.468
Similarly, the Eastern District of California concluded that
exhaustion of remedies to exclusion is futile in the absence of a tribal
court.469
However, courts considering whether such remedies satisfy
due process should take a narrow purview, upholding the strict
requirements of ICRA without coercing tribal governments to
restructure. As discussed above, tribal courts have vigilantly upheld
the proper procedures of exclusion, and the federal courts should
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defer to those procedures. But when tribal courts lack the power to
review exclusion orders, the tribes risk swift and far reaching federal
intervention that may infringe upon sovereignty.
Sweet provides an example of a federal court that insisted on
a minimum of due process but remained deferential to tribal
government in structuring how due process would operate.470 As
such, it provides guidance to tribes worried about federal
intervention. The petitioners were challenging their exclusion by
petitioning the tribal council.471 The court also held that the notice
provided was insufficient to satisfy due process. Under such facts,
the court granted the first writ of habeas corpus since Martinez was
decided. In doing so, it carefully limited its order:
[It] refuse[d] Petitioners’ invitation to determine
whether the charges against them were or were not
false…[and] decline[d] Petitioners’ request to
determine what rules and procedures regarding
[exclusion] Respondents either had in place or
should have had in place. The court also [would] not
determine whether Respondents followed the rules
and procedures they had in place or whether they
should have followed certain other rules and
procedures. Beyond determining whether or not
Petitioners were provided with notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the court [did] not believe it
should delve into the inner workings of the
[exclusion] process.472
Not only will the establishment of the measures lacking in Sweet
dissuade federal court intervention, it will also provide meaningful
civil rights to tribal members.473
Rob Roy Smith recommends two steps establishing a system
of administrative and judicial review. First, tribes should provide an
administrative mechanism of review to allow tribal executives and
legislatures to reconsider exclusion decisions.474 Second, tribes
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should ensure “the existence of a fully functioning independent
tribal court system” to review those administrative decisions.475 Of
course, this two-step model is only instructive and those operating
in accordance with the model should defer to the plurality of tribal
legal traditions.476 Even if this process is properly informed by tribal
tradition, ICRA requires any resultant system of review to provide
for procedural protections, such as notice and hearing.
Courts considering the issuance of habeas corpus writs
should be careful to avoid providing substantive direction to tribes.
Habeas corpus relief under section 1303 of ICRA is limited to
correcting infringements of rights under § 1302, as interpreted under
tribal law. The appropriate consequence of a petition for habeas
corpus, therefore, should never be a direction to readmit the
excluded or reenroll the disenrolled. Rather, courts should remand
such matters so such infringments can be reevaluated in tribal court
in accordance with tribal law.477 At the time of ICRA’s passage,
Congress noted that ICRA “should not be considered as the final
solution to the many serious constitutional problems confronting the
American Indian.”478 While this statement shows only a partial view
of the good work underway in Indian country, it reflects the contest
between federal courts and tribes to solve those problems where they
still arise. Tribes can take the lead by establishing processes for the
review of exclusion decisions that better comply with ICRA.
Just as courts should be slow to direct substantive results on
the issuance of habeas corpus, they should also be quick to accept
tribal efforts to remedy procedural deficiencies on remand. In Quair,
the District Court for the Eastern District of California held that it
was unclear whether the tribe had adequately protected the due
process rights of the excluded.479 Following the district court’s
order, the tribe’s general council notified the excluded petitioners
that it would hold a rehearing to reconsider the exclusion.480 It
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informed the petitioners that they would have the right to counsel at
the hearing as well as the right to present and cross-examine
witnesses.481 The petitioners refused to attend, arguing that such a
hearing would still violate ICRA as the tribe lacked a court with
formal judicial procedures.482 In the petitioners’ absence, the general
council again voted to exclude the petitioners.483
Reviewing the matter again, the Eastern District of
California held the newly provided measures likely to be
adequate.484 The court also recognized that they differed from
Anglo-American due process.485 Namely, the tribe’s general
council, constituting its entire membership, had combined
executive, legislative, and judicial functions.486 Further, the tribe
had no written standards to govern the procedure of exclusion.487
On these bases, the disenrolled petitioners contended that the
tribe had violated ICRA per se, but the court refused to enter a per
se analysis.488 Rather it employed a test promulgated by the Ninth
Circuit in Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court.489 Under the
Randall test, a court considering a tribal procedural matrix that
“differ[s] significantly from those ‘commonly employed in AngloSaxon society’” must “weigh ‘the individual right to fair treatment’
against ‘the magnitude of the tribal interest’ [in employing these
procedures] to determine whether the procedures pass muster under
[ICRA].”490 Such an approach best serves to “guarantee that tribal
governments respect civil rights while minimizing federal

481

Id.
Id.
483
Id. at *2.
484
Id. at *5.
485
Id.
486
Id.
487
Id.
488
Id. at *4.
489
Randall v. Yakima Nation, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988).
490
Quair, 2007 WL 1490571 at *5 (quoting Randall, 841 F.2d at 900 (citations
omitted)). However, the Ninth Circuit also recognized that when the “comity
analysis concerns for respecting a sovereign’s procedures and avoiding
paternalism are reduced when tribal court laws and procedures governing trials
and appeals track those of our federal courts.” Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc.,
255 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001). When tribal law so tracks its federal
counterpart, courts within the Ninth Circuit must apply federal standards. Id.
Thus, while tribes must balance other comity concerns in drafting statutes that
depart from their state and federal equivalents, they should do so aware that a
federal court sitting in habeas review may interpret them through the colonizing
lens of federal law.
482

266

interference with tribal culture and tradition.”491 Because the
petitioners in Quair made no argument why their interests
outweighed those of the tribe in maintaining its independent
procedures, the court denied their petition for habeas relief.492
In sum, tribes should continue developing and protecting due
process rights of the excluded. As seen throughout this article, tribes
have done just that. Their lawmakers have crafted elaborate
exclusion codes that establish certain due process rights and their
courts have interpreted these to protect those facing exclusion.
Tribes, cognizant of their unique challenges and strengths, their
traditions and histories, are best equipped to define due process in
this context. Accordingly, federal courts should narrowly construe
ICRA to avoid impairing tribal efforts to do justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The power to exclude is by no means a panacea to the
challenges facing Indian country. An example, drawn again from
Alaska, is illustrative. Derek Adams grew up in his Yup’ik home
village of Nunam Iqua.493 He suffered neglect from his mother and
abuse from his father.494 He took to beating and burning dogs
because he was angry that he had “never got[ten] to experience what
every other kid got to experience with their parents.”495 In 2012, he
shot his father.496 The elder Adams and his girlfriend had been
drinking homebrew when the father, driven by jealous paranoia,
threatened to kill his girlfriend and burn Derek in his house.497
Derek, who was frightened, reacted in violence.498
In 2013, Derek was drunk too.499 He went to a village
hangout but could not get in. He smoked a cigarette and failed to put
it out.500 The building caught fire, burning three people, including
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Derek’s godfather and an eight-year-old boy to death.501 Nunam
Iqua banished him for life.502 He moved to the neighboring village
of Emmonak.503 The elder city manager told him he was “not a bad
person…[but] a good person [with]…a chance to make a change in
[his] life.”504 He told him to “[t]ake it from here” before banishing
him as well.505 Derek ended up as a day laborer in Bethel, hungry,
homeless, and alone.506
Easy answers do not exist in a case like Derek’s. Exclusion
is particularly powerful medicine because it undermines an equally
powerful asset for tribal members: community belonging. Substance
abuse denied Derek a fair childhood and led him down a path of
recklessness, violence, and isolation. But that abuse and its
consequences, along with the absence of law enforcement resources
from within or without the village’s tribal government, made
exclusion necessary.
The cases discussed throughout this article show the severity
of exclusion, but they also show its vital utility to tribes working to
protect their communities. Tribes have carefully applied this power,
both since time immemorial and in modern legislation tailored to
their needs and the impact of applicable federal law. They have
interpreted this legislation in their courts to protect the civil due
process rights of the excluded. These examples provide not only
inspiration to other tribal lawmakers, but a caution to non-tribal
authorities that would try to intervene and subvert tribal sovereignty.
The courts have recognized the necessity of exclusion since
the founding years of the American Republic. They have
concordantly affirmed the same sovereign power in tribal
governments, possessed since time immemorial, as an incident of
the sovereign police authority. Additionally, the United States
entered treaties affirming that power.
But policies of allotment changed all that. Since Congress
embarked on that policy and began dicing the tribal land base, the
courts have become less consistent. Thus, cases like Merrion and
Brendale recognize the basic connection of the exclusion authority
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to tribal sovereignty, but others like Montana and Strate reduce it to
a stick in the private landowner’s bundle of rights.
For their part, the political branches have tried to mitigate
the judicial assault on the exclusion power. The United States
Attorneys for two districts have brought the might of the federal
government to support tribal exclusion orders, and Congress has
reaffirmed tribal jurisdiction over domestic violence and may do the
same over drug crimes and violence towards children. The
Department of Justice should issue guidance requiring that Assistant
United States Attorneys charge exclusion order violations as
trespasses under state law or else draft and submit memoranda
justifying their declination.
Yet change must come in the judiciary. The schizophrenic
nature of existing precedent provides the courts with the tools to
recognize a broader tribal power of exclusion. They can return to a
recognition of this right as an incident of sovereign police authority.
Or they can strongly affirm its support in the Montana exceptions.
Additionally, courts should be slow to apply federal
accommodations statutes that would impair sovereign tribal
exclusion authority. And when petitioned to issue writs of habeas
corpus, those courts should defer to tribal procedural mechanisms
and avoid imposing substantive requirements on tribal governance.
Such statutes and the possibility of habeas corpus relief may
advance important policy goals, but those goals are best pursued
through tribal governance, reflecting the will of tribal communities
and the strength of tribal sovereignty.
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